Harvard Israel Review

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Issue 2 ~ Fall 2002

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Ronen Mukamel

On Ignoring Anti-Semitism
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HARVARD ISRAEL REVIEW

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Special thanks to the Allan S. Gordon Foundation, the Bronfman Youth Fellowships, and to all of our individual contributors, without whose generous contributions this publication could not exist.

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from the editors

This issue of HARVARD ISRAEL REVIEW reflects the work of many individuals over the course of several months. It also reflects a shared concern about the continued violence in the Middle East, the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the Arab world and in Europe, and the quality of discussion about these issues at Harvard. The work presented herein is thus a modest attempt to enhance the degree of historical knowledge among students and to promote a deeper a understanding of the problems that Israel and the West now face.

Recent months have brought heated debate at Harvard on the subject of anti-Semitism and criticism of the Israeli government. We would like to reiterate, first, that there is a difference between thoughtful criticism of a particular Israeli action or policy—something all members of a free society are permitted and indeed obliged to voice—and anti-Zionism, the more sweeping opposition to Israel's very existence as a Jewish state. We would also suggest that there are ways to be critical even of Zionism without being anti-Semitic. Just as grateful Americans may criticize American policies and particular schools of thought, so too can those with goodwill towards Israel question Israeli political decisions and ideological trends.

The key to such thoughtful criticism is goodwill—or one might say good faith. Yet many of Israel's critics today speak not out the desire to understand Zionism as it understood and understands itself—as the remarkable success of the Jewish people's struggle for political autonomy on their ancestral land—but rather to filter it through the lens of their own theories, particularly of the post-colonialist and liberationist varieties. In this spirit, many also overlook the past events and developments that have led the Jewish state to its current position—that of a reluctant warrior—and ignore the vast difference in political culture that separates Israel from her neighbors.

In short, rather than trying to understand Israel and the Arab world as they understand themselves, many progressive thinkers in the West merely impose on them their own distorting theoretical paradigms, be they post-modernist or social-scientific. In the case of Israel, this vein of interpretation results in a failure to appreciate the centrality of self-criticism in Israeli society—resulting from a history of endless argumentation and from democratic political life more generally—as well as the dangers of existing as a pluralist democracy amidst self-asserting, vengeful dictatorships. In the case of the Arab and Muslim worlds, the bad faith school tends to downplay the power of widespread resentment and longing for past glory, of radical Islam as a distinctly modern ideology, and of the anti-Semitic, anti-Western sentiment permeating society. Both cases utlimately illustrate that failing to understand a culture in its own terms means essentially denying the power of ideas in shaping the life of a nation.

In this light, while we are wary of self-victimization and of the danger of using labels to silence political opposition, we believe it is essential to acknowledge anti-Semitism where it does exist. We believe that Jewish fears of being singled out for blame, harrassment, and violence are often well grounded and should not be dismissed. We live in a time in which Jews are targeted and murdered daily on the grounds of being Jewish; in which Jewish rallies and vigils for peace in the Middle East draw hateful rhetoric and even physical assults; and in which it is acceptable for noted scholars to discriminate against Israeli academics and to portray the Jewish state as the villain in a conflict during which it has often been the sole voice of compromise. If this violence, this harrassment, and this ideological venom towards Israel are not anti-Semitic in some form or other, it is hard to know what is.

Many of the views now promulgated throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds are deeply frightening and destructive, and until they are countered neither Israel nor America—nor Europe, for that matter—will see much peace. Moreover, many of our own nation's scholars have unjustly corrupted the minds of their students and dulled their moral judgment with theories that sacrifice human understanding for methodological coherence. When students argue on a public email list that it is legitimate to advocate killing Israeli settlers in protest of the "occupation," one sees not only the shadows of anti-Semitism but also the troubling influence of ideas that deny the importance of ideas.

We therefore offer this review with a deep appreciation for the power of ideas and with gratitude for the freedom to express our own. We urge you to do the same, and look forward to hearing from you.

With regards and thanks for reading,
Rachel Zabarkes, for the editors

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correspondence

To the Editors:

I am a law student in Paris, France.

First of all, I would like to thank you for your interesting review. I just finished reading your article about M. Azmi Bishara (and appreciated your reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau).

I'd also like to share with you the special atmosphere in Paris regarding the Israeli-Palestinian problem. As you probably know, French public opinion does not support the State of Israel. French foreign policy has rarely been in favour of Israel since 1948, and now the French government disapproves of Israeli activities. There are a lot of demagogic ideas being spread around, accusing Israel of apartheid and colonialism and comparing Israel to Iraq in terms of UN decisions. There are stickers pasted on drainpipes in my street reading "Apartheid in Israel, boycott Israeli products." There is no need to demonstrate how impoverished this political idea is: Destroying the Israeli economy will not help either Palestinians or Israelis to resolve their problems and build peace. As far as I am concerned, I would rather ignore those who reduce the Israeli-Palestinian problem to Manichean thought. This conflict is a tragedy for both parties involved.

Sincerely yours,
Mathias Turjman
Paris, France

To the Editors:

I was directed to your web page by Jay Nordlinger. I will be a regular reader.

I am not Jewish, but I am an admirer of all that the Jewish people have accomplished. I stand behind Israel and will not tolerate the utterance of an anti-Semitic remark in my presence. In this day and age, we draw back from the notion of evil. But I have very sadly come to accept that there is evil in the world. Nazism was evil and murderous. I am proud to be the son of a man who fought against it. Communism *is* evil and murderous (as the enslaved peoples of China, North Korea, and Cuba can attest) and must be opposed. Radical Islam is evil and murderous and it too must be opposed.

In the end, truth wins. It often takes years and much sacrifice, but the truth will win. In my lifetime I have witnessed the liberation of so many. I have faith that radicalized Muslim and Arab culture and politics will eventually break under the irrepressible weight of truth. We will never fully be rid of radicalized Islam, but we can do quite a lot to minimize its impact. Sadly, I believe anti-Semitism will be with us always. But again, truth is the best weapon to minimize its impact and the number of minds diseased by it.

Best wishes for success,
George Murchio
New Jersey

To the Editors:

I just wanted to congratulate you all on your new journal. With articles like those in the first issue, the West will no longer have an excuse to be deceived by Arafat.

Sincerely,
Allison Collins
Houston, TX

To the Editors:

Just a quick note to say good for you all. I read about you on National Review Online, and wanted to send my kudos out to all of you for standing up in a place like Harvard.

Nick Hodges
St. Paul, MN

Harvard Israel Review considers all letters received for publication. Please send comments to hireview@hcs.harvard.edu. HIR reserves the right to edit letters.

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In Memoria

It is far too easy to forget the quiet victims of terrorism and the political oversights that let their killers go free. HIR remembers the case of Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly wheelchair-bound vacationer who in 1985 was rewarding himself for a lifetime of hard work with a cruise on the Italian liner Achille Lauro when a gang of Palestinian terrorists hijacked the ship. The terrorists learned that Klinghoffer was Jewish, and, in an act of "jest," shot him in the head as his wife looked on. Then, laughing and joking, they dumped his body and wheelchair overboard. U.S. forces captured the group of men responsible for this crime, but soon turned them over to Italy out of political, diplomatic, and legal considerations. The Italians then proceeded to release them one by one, in the hopes of avoiding trouble on their own soil. The leader of the group, Abu Abbas, has thus far suffered no punishment or even inconvenience for the crime, as National Review's John Derbyshire and Jay Nordlinger have pointed out. In fact, according to a CNN report, by 1996 Abbas had become a respected politician, "rushing from meeting to meeting, lunching with officials of the new Palestinian National Authority, networking, listening and making suggestions." Although an Italian court has finally convicted him of murder, he is now living in Baghdad under the protection of Saddam Hussein, sending messages of fraternity and support to Arafat from the headquarters of his Palestine Liberation Front, an offshoot of the PLO. Of course, should President Bush carry out his threat to effect a regime change in Iraq, Abbas' fate could change dramatically. But even should that day of justice come, may we never forget the cruelty of those who have inflicted suffering on the Klinghoffers and countless others like them. And may we never forgive the complicity of those who let murderers go free.

Temple Mount Trauma

The holiest site in Judaism may soon come crashing down. The Temple Mount, the site of the first and second Jewish temples and now home to two Muslim mosques, has been seriously damaged in recent years by the activities of the Palestinian Authority. Since the mid-1990s, when Israel granted the Palestinian Authority (PA) control over Muslim holy sites in the Old City of Jerusalem, the PA has made a number of physical changes in order to increase Muslim claims to the area. Most recently, the PA converted Solomon's Stables, an ancient section on the southern end of Mount, into a mosque. In the process, it removed a number of structural supports, creating a 28-inch bulge over the Southern Wall and a troubling leak in the stones of the Western Wall. According to Jerusalem archaeologist Eilat Mazar, the PA "is working methodically to convert the entire Temple Mount into a mosque—which is illegal and dangerous to the region." In what has already become a familiar story, the PA has again demonstrated its complete lack of consideration for Jews' historical and religious interests in the land of Israel (not to mention those of Christians and Muslims, who also regard the site as holy). As a result, it has wantonly altered and nearly destroyed an irreplaceable landmark.

Unjust Analogy

Columbia Professor Edward Said recently likened the current condition of Palestinians with that of the Jews during the Nazi Holocaust. Israel, he said, uses its power for "evil purposes," executing "catastrophes...against the Palestinian people" and surrounding Arafat "like a hunted Jew." Let's take a minute to look closer at the this comparison. The Jews of Germany and Eastern Europe had nothing like the power Arafat and the Palestinians have now. They did not receive weapons from Arab countries as Palestinians do; they did not have international political recognition as Palestinians do; they did not have anything resembling the territorial sovereignty Palestinians do as a result of the Oslo Accords. Nor were Europe's Jews in the midst of a violent uprising against Nazi Germany when they were massacred by the millions. In fact, if Said's analogy holds at all, it is because in the contemporary Middle East, as during the Holocaust, civilian Jews are targeted and killed simply for the fact of

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being Jewish. Recent research conducted by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, a think-tank based in Hertzliya, used official Palestinian and Israeli statistics to calculate the civilian and combatant casualty rates of each population during the Intifada. According to Palestinian data, 55 percent of Palestinian casualties were combatants—and this doesn't include anyone under age 13, even if they were armed at the time of death. Meanwhile, on the Israeli side, only 25 percent dead were combatants. Even more striking, less than 5 percent of Palestinian casualties were female, while 30 percent of Israeli casualties were women (for every Palestinian woman killed, more than three Israeli women have been lost). In light of this evidence, it is difficult to believe Said's Manichean picture of murderous Jews and innocent Palestinians; in fact, by distorting the holocaust analogy beyond recognition, he diminishes the severity of the loss of Jewish life in both cases. If only Said were as sensitive to the past and continued suffering of Jews as he insists the world be to that of Palestinians.

Gratitude Where Gratitude Is Due

"Here's a question to our critics," said Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Tex) at a recent gathering of American Christians in support of Israel. "Do we want Israel to look more like the Middle East, or do we want the rest of the Middle East to start looking more like Israel?" Religious Christians in America have of late been among the most ardent supporters of Israel in the world, and despite the continuous repudiation of some circles of American Jews, they continue to emphasize the fundamental similarities between the two democratic states. In fact, while many Jews associate Christian support of Israel with apocalyptic prophesies about a coming battle of Armageddon, or seek to distance themselves from the religious right because of disagreements on domestic issues, it is clear that the pro-Israel stance of many religious Christians today is not theological or partisan in nature. It is, rather, an appreciation of the fact that both America and Israel are free societies that value the rule of law and promote religious tolerance. As Delay continued, "citizens of free nations share a bond that flows from a common set of enduring principles," principles which for the most part are not shared by contemporary Arab regimes. Former presidential candidate and Reagan policy advisor Gary Bauer also noted at the rally that while Palestinians cheered on September 11, Israelis lowered their flags in mourning. "We will not forget who stood with us on 9-11," Bauer said. Neither should American Jews forget who is standing with Israel now.

Not in Who's Name?

A recent "peace protest" in New York's Central Park confirmed just how easily criticism of Israel slips into old-fashioned anti-Semitism these days. The rally, organized by a celebrity-backed group called Not in Our Name, brought out the kinds of anti-Semitic rhetoric one might assume to have died with Hitler. According to the *New York Sun*, one self-proclaimed "peace activist" said that "Bush is more Israeli than the Israelis themselves. He is a puppet of the Zionists [who] control the media, the government and the economy. The Jews' book—the Protocols of the Elders of Zion—explains how they control the world and how they make people fight against each other." Another attendee proclaimed that "Israel is creating a holocaust of its own.... There are powerful Jewish people in the nation—wealthy lawyers and bankers. They control a lot of the money and Bush doesn't want them to be upset." "I know a lot of Palestinians and I've hung around with too many Jews," said another. And these aren't just the voices of thugs on the street. Celebrities Susan Sarandon and Tim Robbins attended the gathering, and Not in Our Name published a statement signed by famed playright Tony Kushner, feminist Gloria Steinem, and rabbi Michael Lerner of *Tikkun* magazine. If these liberal-minded personalities are taken aback by the illiberal sentiments exposed at the rally, perhaps they should apply their group's motto, "not in our name," to the intolerance and anti-democratic sentiment its own position on Israel seems to convey.

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Not Luck, Intervention

On September 18, a suicide bomber detonated his load at a bus stop outside the Arab-populated city of Umm al Fahm in the north of Israel. The blast not only killed Moshe Hezkiyah, a 21-year old Police Sergeant, and wounded three others, but also triggered a wave-effect of international media dispatches heralding an end to what was uniformly reported as a "six-week lull in suicide bombings." The contention was that between the suicide bomb that killed nine and injured 50 at the Meron Junction on August 4, and the back-to-back explosions on September 18 and 19, those in charge of dispatching would-be martyrs had chosen to suspend their horrific terror tactics. Yet in fact, as a cursory review of the statistics shows, any perceived "lull" was really the result of the vigilance of Israeli security forces, plus a strong dose of luck. Israeli intelligence sources document fifty-one cases in which they foiled potential suicide attacks, thirty-eight of which involved the interdiction of bombers on their way to the site. Police Superintendent Gil Kleiman reports that in addition to the apprehension of 76 terrorists caught "in the act," scores of other attacks were also carried out. A total of 144 actual incidents of terror were counted, including 28 shootings, 10 grenade attacks, nine rocket launchers discovered, five mortal shells resulting in injuries, three incendiary devices found, and one knife attack. Captain Jacob Dallal of the IDF Operations branch reported that in September alone, eight Qassem workshops were found in Gaza and more than 70 in the West Bank. Qassem rockets and launchers were discovered in a village west of Nablus, ready for activation. This marked the first time that a missile in the West Bank was aimed and ready for launching. Such a missile could reach from Qalqilya to Sharon (the highly-populated coastal area north of Tel Aviv). Regardless of how the numbers are expressed, any calculation confirms the obvious: that the level of hostilities between August 5 and September 18 belies any suggestion of a "lull" in either suicide bombings or terror attacks. ***(By Felice Friedson, President and CEO of The Media Line Ltd., a non-profit media organization that distributes informational and educational programming from Israel and the Middle East. www.themedialine.org. ©2002 The Media Line Ltd.)***

"Jewish Blood"

The initial claim that the Israeli Defense Forces massacred Palestinians during their incursion into the Jenin refugee camp last spring has been decisively invalidated. As even the United Nations acknowledged in a recent report, the Palestinian casualties there numbered in the dozens—not in the hundreds or thousands as alleged—and most were armed combatants. Nevertheless, there is still a great deal to learn from this event, as Dan Gordon, a peace activist and former IDF sargeant, reveals in a startling but utterly disregarded story. Writing in the *Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles*, Gordon relates the story of Dr. David Zangen, chief medical officer of the Israeli paratroop unit, which did most of the fighting in Jenin. According to Zangen, Israelis not only worked to keep the hospital in Jenin open during the operation, but they also offered Palestinians blood for their wounded. Palestinians, however, refused the offer on the grounds that it was Jewish blood. "That is a chilling story to an American for my age," writes Gordon, "with memories of white, bigoted-racial purists refusing to accept blood from African Americans in the segregated South." The Israeli response to this refusal is even more striking. Instead of walking away from the wounded, the IDF flew in 2,000 units of blood from Jordan—acceptable because not Jewish—and facilitated the delivery of 1,800 units of anti-coagulants from Morocco. They also ensured that 40 units of blood from the Mukasad Hospital in East Jerusalem made it to the hospital in Ramallah, and that 70 units got to the hospital in Tul Quarem. (Gordon confirmed this story to the exact numbers with the IDF Military Spokesman's office; HIR also confirmed the account with a key military source.) Gordon closes his article with a question: "...How do you negotiate with a hatred so great that it will refuse to accept your blood, even to save its own people's lives? How does an international community vilify a nation that offers its own blood to its enemies, while its own solders lie dying," and that "diverts military flights to bring blood more suitable to the taste of those who would destroy them?"

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The United Nations: Dividing Israelis and Arabs for Over 50 Years

ronen mukamel

> The UN's consideration of Israel...has been a continuing case study of political manipulation, mistreatment and dishonesty. What this record tells Americans is that the near-theological rhetoric about the UN's purposes and principles is *just* rhetoric, pure and simple.
>
> *John Bolton, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute, to the 106th U.S. Congress, July 14, 1999.*[1]

The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of World War II to protect the world "from the scourge of war" and maintain "international peace and security." It was to be a democratic forum, "based on...the sovereign equality of all its members,"[2] in which feuding member-nations could solve their conflicts through diplomacy rather than warfare. As part of its mission, the UN sought to promote democratic ideals such as human rights and racial equality around the world.

Yet, as Bolton points out, the UN's actions have not always lived up to its ideals. In September 2001, for example, the UN held its first Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa. Despite its lofty name, the conference ultimately did little to combat racism. In fact, it may have done more to promote it. The Arab delegates hijacked the conference, replacing language in the conference's declaration that condemned anti-Semitism with language that equated Zionism and racism.[3] The conference became such a one-sided attack on Israel that both the United States and Israel decided to abandon it altogether. The incident was truly unfortunate: The conference, rather than uniting the world against the common enemy of racism, became a political tool to slander Israel and further divide the world along racial lines.

Much to the detriment of the world and the Middle East in particular, similar episodes are all too common at the UN. For over fifty years, the Arab bloc has, with the support of its Muslim and African allies, been able to obtain an automatic majority to promote countless anti-Israeli resolutions and policies that often fly in the face of all sense of reason and balance. Rather than becoming the positive force for peace in regions like the Middle East that its founders intended, the UN has become the political tool of the Arab world to slander Israel and promote its own agenda. Under Arab control, the UN has subjected Israel to an undeniable double standard while legitimizing terrorist Palestinian groups that aim to destroy the Jewish state. The UN hinders constructive dialogue between Israel and its neighbors by providing a powerful podium for uncompromising Arab maximalists to attack Israel and exacerbate the conflict. The UN has fallen short of its ideal of equality among nations, and instead succumbed to a near dictatorship of Arab interests—interests that too often work against the welfare of Western democracies in general and Israel in particular.

The Double Standard

While the UN claims to be based on "the sovereign equality" of its members, it unabashedly holds Israel

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to a double standard. As in the Conference Against Racism last year, the UN consistently singles Israel out on a variety of issues, including racial equality and human rights, while allowing other countries with far worse records—including, most often, Israel's Arab accusers—to escape with little or no censure at all.

The UN's discrimination against Israel is, in part, institutionalized. Since Israel joined the UN, it has been the only member not afforded the rights of other nations. The UN acts through a system of UN-run bodies each of which has a different set of objectives. Representation in several key UN bodies, like the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, is based on groups of nations called regional groups. In order to sit on these committees, a member nation must belong to one of these groups. Yet the Asian group, in which Israel belongs geographically, is comprised mainly of Arab states that have blocked its entrance for over fifty years. For Israel to gain acceptance, the nations in the Asian group must agree unanimously, which will not happen in the foreseeable future because this requires the assent of nations like Syria, Iran and Iraq.[4] Because of Israel's exclusion from the Asian group, Israel has been the only member nation not eligible to sit on bodies like the Security Council. In June 2000, Israel finally gained membership in another regional group, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). While Israel's WEOG membership significantly increases Israel's rights within the UN, the membership lasts only four years and is limited to WEOG offices in New York. Israel is still unable to participate in discussions about a variety of issues including human rights and racism in every other UN office around the world.[5] While Israel's acceptance into WEOG is a step in the right direction, Israel is still the only nation not afforded the rights of every other member nation.

In addition to, and in part because of, institutional discrimination against Israel, most of the resolutions the UN has passed on conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors have been hopelessly one-sided. The most infamous of these resolutions was the 1975 General Assembly (GA) resolution that "*Determines* that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."[6] Zionism is the national aspiration of the Jewish people and manifests itself in the Jewish state, Israel. The resolution asserts that the UN opposes Israel's existence as a homeland for Jews because the principles underlying its existence are racist. Statements like these not only contradict the UN's affirmation that every member nation is sovereign and equal, but also preclude it from promoting peace in the region by showing that the UN rejects Israel's very existence, let alone its claim to secure and recognized borders.

The resolution not only contravenes the UN's purported objective, but the assertion that Israel is racist ignores the facts. The Jewish state does not, and has never discriminated based on race. While at the time the resolution was passed, Israel had not extended the full rights of citizenship to those living in the territories captured in the Six-Day War, this decision was not based on race. Israel denied citizenship to the civilians living in the territories because they were hostile to Israel and because Israel had pressing security needs—not because they were Arab. In fact, many Arabs had been living in Israel as full citizens since Israel's independence in 1948. Furthermore, the Arab bloc that promoted the resolution was guilty of much worse forms of racism. While Arabs lived as equal citizens in Israel, by 1975 hundreds of thousands of Jews who had lived in the Arab world for centuries were expelled from their ancestral homes, most seeking refuge and securing citizenship in Israel.[7] While racial equality in Israel was less than perfect, it was certainly better than in many nations throughout the world, in particular the Arab world.

The UN finally repealed this egregious resolution in 1991. However, as Bolton reported to the U.S. Congress' Committee on International Relations in July of 1999, the campaign to repeal the resolution, "which should have been a self-evident proposition," was extraordinarily difficult and took the direct involvement of high-level diplomats including then President Bush. Bolton goes on to conclude that "the very difficulty of repealing [the Zionism-is-racism resolution] showed just how deeply ingrained in the UN system were its venomous precepts, and why, even after repeal, its effects linger."[8] The fact that Arab nations are now trying to revive the Zionism-is-racism doctrine as they did at the Conference Against Racism last year speaks to Bolton's assessment that the UN's bias is deep-seated.

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While the Zionism-is-racism resolution was one of the most venomous anti-Israeli resolutions passed in the UN, as Bolton points out, it was "only the most visible of a long series...of offensive, anti-Israel, anti-American and anti-Western resolutions."[9] The GA, in 1998, passed 21 resolutions concerning Israel, all of which were critical of the Jewish state. Almost all of the resolutions were passed near-unanimously. Nineteen passed with only the U.S. and Israel voicing dissent; the remaining two had a few more opponents, but still passed by wide margins.[10] At the annual UN Commission on Human Rights, Israel's alleged human rights violations merited a full agenda item, while the combined violations in the other 184 member states were discussed in one other agenda item. Of all the resolutions passed in the annual commission, 26 percent condemned Israel, while Syrian and Libyan abuses have never been mentioned.[11]

Terror Justified: A Special PLO-UN Relationship

In December of 1970, the GA passed a resolution recognizing the legitimate right of "liberation movements" to use "all the necessary means at their disposal"[14] to achieve their objectives. Four years after the GA passed this resolution green-lighting terrorism, the UN officially endorsed the terrorist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian refugees. The relationship between the PLO and the UN flourished from that point forward. The UN granted the PLO more privileges than any other non-member-nation. The PLO, in turn, twisted the UN's democratic ideals to promote its terrorist war to destroy Israel.

The UN invited Yasser Arafat, then leader of the PLO, to speak before the GA in 1974. At the time, the

The UN's resolution that Zionism is racism was tantamount to opposing Israel's very existence as a homeland for Jews, alleging that the basic principles underlying that existence are racist.

In February of 1999, an Emergency Session of the GA convened to discuss issues relating to Israeli construction in East Jerusalem and passed resolution ES-106 entitled: "Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem And the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory." Under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution,[12] these emergency sessions can be called when the Security Council fails its mandate to maintain international peace. The UN rarely convenes these special sessions and only ten have been called in the UN's history. Of these, six concerned Israel.[13] While in the UN's view, the genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslovia did not merit these special sessions, Israeli construction in East Jerusalem did. The UN is obsessed with Israel—a country that comprises about one tenth of one percent of the world's population. An organization truly concerned with fighting human rights abuses and racial inequity around the world would not focus such a disproportionate amount of energy on Israel.

PLO's stated objective was the destruction of Israel and its weapon of choice was terror. In an interview in *The Washington Post* in 1970, Arafat spelled out the PLO's goals clearly: "The goal of our struggle is the end of Israel, and there can be no compromise."[15] Two years later, PLO terrorists killed eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The Palestinian National Council, the legislative body of the PLO, reaffirmed its rejectionist policy in its 13th annual meeting in 1977, declaring it would not deal with "the racist Zionist regime" and that it would continue its armed resistance "without peace or recognition."[16] The objective of destroying Israel remained in the covenant of the council until 1996. When the UN legitimized Arafat and his terrorist organization by inviting him to speak in front of the GA, his ambition was to destroy Israel through violence and destruction.

Several months after Arafat's speech, the GA took the unprecedented step of inviting Arafat's PLO, a non-

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nation organization, to officially join the discussion about the Palestinian conflict with Israel as a permanent observer. The UN crowned the PLO the "representative of the Palestinian people," even though its stated objective was destruction and war—not peace, as the UN purported to promote.[17] Worse still, by embracing the PLO as the Palestinian representative, the UN undermined more moderate forces within the Arab community who may have actually been able to achieve peace with Israel. The PLO, as an organization created and nominally controlled by foreign Arab states, was by no means the only natural choice. Jordan's King Hussein, for instance, had long been an advocate for moderation with respect to Israel and, as the leader of the nation from which Israel captured the West Bank, was in a unique position to negotiate a final peace agreement.

With a foothold in the UN, the PLO proceeded to use the resources of the organization for its political objectives. In November 1975, a PLO-inspired resolution created the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), comprising of twenty member-nations, sixteen of which did not have diplomatic relations with Israel at the time.[18] The following year, the committee was established and made its recommendations, which were at base a restatement of the PLO's objectives.[19] The committee recommended a two-phased program that essentially called for Israel's destruction. In the first phase, the Arabs would set up an interim "entity" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip along the pre-1967 borders. The PLO insisted on the term "entity" (as opposed to "state") to ensure it would not be forced to settle for a state in only the West Bank and Gaza. In the second phase, the UN would help the PLO "enable Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967 to exercise their right to return to their homes and property."[20] The now infamous "right" of return would, as both Israel and the PLO knew, create an Arab majority throughout Israel, giving the PLO complete control and either destroying the state of Israel entirely or destroying its character as a Jewish state. The committee disguised its recommendation to dismantle Israel as the fulfillment of Palestinian rights. The U.S. said the committee's recommendations were "totally devoid of balance" and vetoed the committee's recommendations in the Security Council.[21] Nevertheless, the GA—in which the U.S. does not have veto power—adopted the Council's recommendations with little change. By adopting such a one-sided position on the situation in Israel, the GA showed itself to be incapable of resisting the political power of the PLO.

In the years that followed, the PLO gained more power in the UN and began to use the organization to do more than pass one-sided resolutions. In 1977, the GA voted for the creation of the Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR) within the Secretariat that was meant to publish studies, with the help of the CEIRPP, about "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people."[22] The DPR became another tool for the PLO to promote its campaign against Israel under the guise of Palestinian rights. The DPR's first Political Affairs officer went so far as to say that "everyone working in the [division] believes in the ideals of the PLO."[23] While the DPR was not the first PLO attempt to use the UN to further its political agenda, it was the first attempt to do so through the Secretariat. While other UN-bodies like the GA are comprised of interested member-nations and are therefore inherently political, the Secretariat ensures that the UN can function on a day-to-day basis and was supposed to be strictly international and unbiased in character. The creation of the DPR showed that even the Secretariat was not safe from the PLO's political influence.

The DPR convened the following year and quickly became a propaganda machine meant to improve the image of the PLO and Yasser Arafat. One of the first tasks the DPR undertook was to establish the annual "International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People." On November 29 each year, CEIRPP holds special sessions as part of this Solidarity Day. For the first observance of the Solidarity Day, the DPR prepared a pro-PLO propaganda film that the *New York Post* called "an exercise in inflammatory irrelevance."[24] The film's blatant misrepresentation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict generated such an uproar, especially in the U.S., that its UN producers were forced to add a thirty second clip of Moshe Dayan addressing the GA and a news clip about a terrorist attack on Israeli schoolchildren. The PLO, outraged by the additions to the film, vetoed the project and the film was never actually released. The International Day of Solidarity is still held every November and is still a

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propaganda tool for the Palestinian cause. On the celebration's website, one can read a selective account of the "History of the Palestine Problem."[25] Almost every instance of Arab aggression against Israel is conspicuously missing from the website's account. The account fails to mention that the Arab nations attacked Israel when it declared its independence in 1948 and makes no mention of the Yom Kippur war of 1973 in which Egypt and Syria directly attacked Israel on the holiest of Jewish holy days. Also, the account's only mention of terrorism refers to both Arab and Jewish violence before Israel's independence. The terrorist war waged by groups like the PLO since Israel's inception is never mentioned. This one-sided account of the conflict provides a dangerous justification for Arab terrorism today. During the current Intifada, many Palestinian sympathizers have justified the horrific campaign of terror and suicide bombings orchestrated by groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad as products of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This theory is indeed completely plausible according to the UN's account of the conflict as published on the Solidarity Day's website. However, history tells us that Palestinian terrorism and Arab aggression predates and provoked the Israeli occupation, not the other way around.[26]

The DPR is only one of the UN bodies that the PLO has used to spout its anti-Israel propaganda. In 1983, the Security Council, considered baseless accusations that Israel was responsible for "mass poisonings" by the PLO. Israel denied the accusations and both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Center for Disease Control confirmed the Israeli position. Nevertheless, the Security Council called for an inquiry into the claims and for complete World Health Organization control of health programs in the territories.[27] More recently, the PLO observer to the UN told the 1997 Commission on Human Rights that Israeli doctors had given Palestinian children HIV—an accusation which of course was later proven false, yet nevertheless contributed to the ongoing denigration of Israel's image in international public opinion.[28]

In addition to legitimizing the PLO's agenda through propaganda, the UN treats Palestinian refugees differently from every other group of refugees to further the Arab political agenda. The UN's High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the body charged with "the world-wide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems"[29] either through repatriation or settlement in another country. The agency cares for all refugees "world-wide" except for Palestinians. Palestinians are cared for by a separate agency, the UN Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), created by the UN in 1949 to specifically address the Palestinian refugee problem. The UNRWA's objectives fundamentally differ from those of the UNHCR in that the UNRWA does not actively seek to permanently settle Palestinian refugees. Instead, the UNRWA only provides humanitarian aid to the refugees. While this may relieve some of the Palestinian's acute suffering, in the long run, this special treatment of Palestinian refugees serves only to perpetuate their political repression.[30] By bearing the cost of maintaining the refugees as a political weapon against Israel, the UN removes the economic incentive for the Arab states to solve the problem. Ralph Galloway, a former UNRWA official, commenting on the UN's policy observed that: "The Arab states do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations and as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don't give a damn whether the refugees live or die."[31] By keeping the Palestinian refugees in limbo with the help of the UN, the Arab states can perpetuate their conflict with Israel and thereby divert both domestic and international attention from their own human rights violations.

In another stunning reminder of how far the UN has deviated from its original goal of promoting peace, the GA condemned the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979. The GA, in an obvious reference to the accords, stated that it "condemns all partial agreements" because, in the view of the majority, such agreements undermined the rights of the Palestinian people.[32] Despite this resolution, the agreement between Israel and Egypt showed for the first time that peace between Israel and Arabs was possible and that Palestinian rights might one day be fulfilled. The Camp David Accords have been a model for peace between Israel and its neighbors: Israel traded land for genuine peace that lasts to this date. The GA's reaction to the Accords is merely an extreme example of how the PLO turned the UN into a peace-condemning organization.

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The UN in the Current Conflict

The UN's actions regarding the current conflict have reflected much of the same bias and extremism. For the first eighteen months of the conflict the UN sat idly by, passing a resolution every now and then that condemned the violence on both sides. During these months, Palestinians intentionally targeted Israeli civilians, a clear violation of international law, in their campaign of terror and suicide bombings. In January 2002, when Israel seized the Karine-A, a ship sailing with 50 tons of Iranian weapons bought by the Palestinian Authority (PA), it became clearer than ever that the PA was in fact promoting terrorism. Despite this, the UN did not see fit to investigate the PA's involvement in the violence over which Arafat claimed to have no control. When Israel invaded the Jenin and Balata refugee camps in February following a spate of suicide attacks and found bomb factories and stockpiles of arms demonstrating that the UN run camps had become hotbeds of terror, the UN did not see fit to confront its own role in facilitating terrorism.[33]

After a second Israeli operation in Jenin in April 2002, when Palestinians and UN officials alleged that a massacre had occurred and that Israel had committed war crimes—even though no substantive evidence to support these claims could be produced—the UN decided to investigate. Israel, with nothing to hide, immediately agreed to a fact-finding mission. Aware of the UN's consistent bias, however, Israel placed several conditions on its cooperation with the commission to ensure a balanced outcome. In the end, the UN proved unwilling to provide any assurance of balance, refusing to investigate allegations of Palestinian wrong doing in Jenin in addition to the allegations against Israel. The UN ultimately aborted the mission.[34] The incident generated a great deal of international attention and damaged Israel's image. The UN finally published a report in August, based on reports made by other humanitarian groups, verifying most of Israel's account of the battle and rejecting the accusation that Israel had committed a massacre in Jenin. While the report refused to judge whether or not Israel had done everything possible to protect civilians, it certainly debunked claims that Israel intentionally massacred Palestinian civilians.[35] The report, unfortunately, received only a fraction of the attention garnered by the initial conflict over the probe and ultimately did little to reverse the damage to Israel's image.

Yosef Tekoah, former Israeli ambassador to the UN, remarked in the preface of *In the Face of Nations*, that:

> Few nations feel as profound an affinity to the ideals of the United Nations as the Jewish people. The vision of universal peace is deeply rooted in the Hebrew Prophets. The concept of a family of nations upholding the values of justice and morality is a cardinal tenet of the Jewish faith. So are also the principles of human rights.[39]

Given that the ideals of the UN and the Jewish state are so commensurate, it is astounding and disheartening that the UN has been so consistently hostile towards Israel. Why does the world's democracy condemn the shining example of democracy in a sea of oppressive Middle Eastern regimes? Former U.S. ambassador John Scali, addressing the GA, explained the apparent contradiction:

> The function of all parliaments is to provide expression to the majority will. Yet, when the rule of the majority becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority will cease to respect or obey it, and the parliament will cease to function. Every majority must recognize that its authority does not extend beyond the point where the minority becomes so outraged that it is no longer willing to maintain the covenant which binds them.[40]

The UN's legitimization of terror and unrelenting bias against Israel do more than hurt Israel's standing in the world. They are evidence of a perversion of the UN's democratic principles. By exacerbating an already hopeless conflict between Arabs and Israelis, the UN undermines the peace and equality among nations it pretends to promote. The UN's consistent mistreatment of Israel demonstrates that the organization does not legitimately express the will of the world but is rather beholden to a tyranny of Arab interests.

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Notes

1. "The Treatment of Israel by the United Nations," hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Congress, July 14, 1999 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 69.
2. "Charter of the United Nations," UN (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html).
3. "Arabs Reject Racism Compromise," CNN.com, September 6, 2001.
4. "Israel's Request to Join WEOG," (http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/UN/weog.html).
5. Israel is barred from UN offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Rome, and Vienna because of its limited membership in WEOG.
6. GA Resolution 3379.
7. It is estimated that in 1948, 850,000 Jews lived in the Arab world. By 1984, only 29,000 remained, most of them having moved to Israel. See Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial* (Chicago: J. KAP, 1984), p. 33.
8. Congress, p. 70.
9. *Ibid.*.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 63 (statistics as of 1999). Both Syria and Libya commonly practice torture, extrajudicial execution and political imprisonment. See the "Human Rights in the Middle East," Amnesty International, (http://www.amnesty-volunteer.org/usa/)mideast/reports/).
12. GA Resolution 337.
13. "GA Emergency Special Sessions," UN (http://www.un.org/ga/documents/liemsps.htm).
14. GA Resolution 2708, as cited in Harris Okun Schoenberg, *A Mandate for Terror: The United Nations and the PLO* (New York: Shapolsky, 1989), p. 73.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
17. GA Resolution 3210, as cited in *Ibid.*, p. 51.
18. GA Resolution 3376, as cited in *Ibid.*, p. 113. The GA appointed 20 nations to sit on the committee: Afghanistan, Cuba, Cyprus, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia. Only four of these countries maintained diplomatic relations with Israel: Cyprus, Malta, Romania, and Turkey.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
23. A. W. Siddiq from Afghanistan as quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 128.
24. *Ibid.*, 131.
25. "The History of the Palestine Problem," UN (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html).
26. For instance, between 1951-1955, Arab terrorists who crossed the borders between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan killed 922 Israelis. For a list of some of the significant terrorist attacks between 1948 and 1967, see "Which Came First, Terrorism or Occupation?" Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ldc0).
27. Congress, p. 93.
28. *Ibid.*
29. "UNHCR," UNHCR (http://www.unhcr.ch).
30. Schoenberg, p. 182.
31. As cited in *Ibid.*
32. GA Resolution 3490.
33. Michael Rubin, "The UN's Refugees," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 2002.
34. David Tell, "The Jenin Probe Ends," *The Daily Standard*, May 1, 2002.
35. "Report of the Secretary-General on Jenin," UN (http://www.un.org/peace/jenin/).
36. Yosef Tekoah, *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), p. 11.
37. Schoenberg, p. 42.

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On Ignoring Anti-Semitism

ruth r. wisse

"Hitler is dead." In April 1945, a headline containing those three words might have heralded the collapse of Nazi Germany and the beginning of the end of World War II. This past May, appearing on the cover of the New Republic, the same words ridiculed the "ethnic panic of the Jews." In the lead essay, Leon Wieseltier, the magazine's literary editor, charged that American Jews, spooked by the history of Jewish persecution, were stoking unwarranted and apocalyptic fears by comparing the Arab war against Israel with Hitler's earlier war against the Jews. The first requirement of security, he advised his readers, was not to imagine the worst on the basis of historical precedent but to "see clearly" the situation of the present.

The article provoked a number of rebuttals, and also a number of strong defenses. In the words of the historian Tony Judt, one of its defenders, Wieseltier had "elegantly dissected those frissons of existential angst in which some in the American Jewish community are wont to indulge themselves." Wieseltier's call for clarity is thus as good a starting point as any to ask whether we have made much progress since Hitler in understanding the political phenomenon that he represented.

Not that Hitler was by any means the first politician in Europe to fulminate against the Jews; but it is certainly true that no one before him had ever organized so radical a political platform. Still, during the years that he was consolidating his power, the majority of European Jews, unwilling or unable to fathom what his policy signified, or how it would be implemented, did not seem to fear him sufficiently. Rather than manifesting the kind of "ethnic panic" that Wieseltier ascribes to their American coreligionists today, they stand retrospectively accused by many historians of having minimized or ignored Hitler's menace until it was too late. Indeed, the same accusation has been extended to that generation's American Jews as well, who have been reproached for failing either to recognize the danger in time or to do what they could to help their beleaguered coreligionists.

We have, then, a variety of possibilities. It could be that the "panic" of today's Jews is an overcompensation for past negligence. It could be, contrarily, that the myopic Jews of the 1930s have finally been blessed with perfect vision, and that yesterday's Mister Magoo has become today's Ted Williams. Or it could simply be, as Wieseltier would have it, that Nazi anti-Semitism is so different in kind from the Arab variety that what would have been a proper response in the former case is improper in the latter. Since Wieseltier's article calls into question "the new recognition of the *reality* of anti-Semitism" (emphasis added), it would help to establish whether there is, today, a major threat to the Jewish people.

The Arab war against Israel has been going on since before the Jewish state was established in 1948, but lately there have been significant changes in its scope, its nature, and the degree of international support it enjoys. Until fairly recently, Arab rulers who exerted despotic or autocratic control over their populations kept the lid on armed aggression issuing from

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their territory. Now, however, radical ideologies and terrorist tactics against Israeli Jews seem to be dominating Arab politics as never before, while in liberal and academic circles everywhere in the West, as well as in the chancelleries of Europe, blame for this state of affairs has fallen largely on the state of Israel itself.

The avant-garde of anti-Israel radicalism has long been the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the bastard offspring of the Arab world's insistence that the Palestinian people be kept demonstrably homeless as permanent evidence of Jewish culpability. The terrorist groups comprising the PLO, and their multiplying rivals, were given unique license by their fellow Arabs to intimidate, to extort, and to kill. Over time, they served their handlers superbly well, doing far greater harm to Israel than all the Arab military assaults combined.

Unlike the Germans who unleashed their war against the Jews under cover of a wider European conflict, the Arab nations, through the PLO, placed the destruction of Israel explicitly at the heart of their mission. The PLO's charter, a public document, defines the Jews as "not a people with an independent identity," branding them as colonial occupiers of land that belongs eternally to the Palestinian people, and their state as an illegitimate "entity" that needs to be eliminated. On these grounds, the PLO not only claimed the moral right to kill Jews but turned their murder into a sacred cause. And this, as the historian Michael Oren has pointed out, does mark one difference between German and Arab anti-Semitism, albeit a difference suggesting that the Arab variety is worse:

> For all the kudos discreetly given SS killers by the regime, Nazi Germany never publicly lionized them, never plastered their pictures on the streets, or openly encouraged children to emulate them. That kind of adoration for mass murderers can only be found, in abundance, among the Palestinians.

In the light of this adoration, indeed, it has become more and more difficult to maintain the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, with the latter defined as "merely" a political-territorial objection to the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. Rather, contemporary anti-Zionism has absorbed all the stereotypes and foundational texts of fascist and Soviet anti-Semitism and applied them to the Middle East. Every stratum of Arab society, from top to bottom, has been nourished on the myth of Israel's illegitimacy, and has been encouraged to express its loyalties through aggressive hostility to the Jewish people and its land.

The dissemination of anti-Jewish propaganda by and within Arab and Muslim societies has lately been swifter than the spread of the Internet. As anyone can discover by punching in the relevant keywords in any major library system, Arabic translations of all the major works of European anti-Semitism have been supplemented by an immense new body of original literature defaming Israel and the Jews. As long ago as 1986, Bernard Lewis could write in *Commentary* that certain Arab countries were the only places in the world "where hard-core, Nazi-style anti-Semitism is publicly and officially endorsed and propagated." Since then, Arab propagandists have been working hard to expand and revitalize the tradition. The sincerity and the steadfastness of this genocidal hostility, proliferating through the press, the visual media, literature, and the schools, are much greater in Arab lands than they ever were in pre-Hitler Europe—which had, after all, a contrary liberal tradition and at least the rudiments of a modern democratic culture. And now, thanks in part to Muslim immigrants, this same hostility has found its way back to the heartland of the very Europe where it originated.

Without citing all the other evidence that anti-Jewish politics is visibly on the rise in Europe, and even in scattered precincts in the United States,* I would therefore suggest that, on the question of the threat itself, Wieseltier has things backward. So obvious is this threat that we should ask why the reality had to wait so long for its "new recognition." But there is an answer to that question as well, and it leads directly to the real gravamen of Wieseltier's article.

Never Again?

Palestinian bombings inside Israel and political /diplomatic assaults against the state's right to exist esca-

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lated dramatically after September 2000, when Yasir Arafat, unleashing the very kind of violence that under the Oslo accords he had solemnly undertaken to quell, launched the second Palestinian intifada. The first intifada, between 1987 and 1993, had claimed 160 Israeli lives. The second killed more than three times as many in twenty months, with thousands of wounded as a result of the explosives that had replaced the knives and stones that were the earlier weapons of choice.

But it was not until a year after the terrorist outbreaks in Israel that the American media and a significant proportion of American Jewry began to air anxieties about anti-Semitism. The reason clearly had to do with an intervening event: namely, September 11. President Bush set a new tone for the nation when he spoke before Congress of "a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom." Although the President drew no analogy between the unprovoked assault on America and escalating Arab attacks against Israeli Jews, it was then that many observers began to think harder about the correspondence between the two types of terror.

At a Washington rally for Israel in April of this year, said to be the largest pro-Israel gathering ever held in the United States, most speakers, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, linked solidarity with Israel to America's war on terror. Representing the government of Israel, Deputy Prime Minister Natan Sharansky saluted the President's determination to wage a global battle against a common enemy. William J. Bennett, who in the wake of 9/11 had founded an organization called Americans for Victory Over Terrorism, pointed to the Holocaust Museum just a few blocks away and said: "What we are seeing today, what Israel is feeling today, was not supposed to happen again." Just as the attack on America had triggered memories of Pearl Harbor, the atrocities in Israel had begun to evoke the mass murders of European Jewry.

Drawing this analogy most insistently was the journalist and critic Ron Rosenbaum, who warned in the New York Observer of a possible "second Holocaust" at the hands of the Arabs should they ever get their hands on weapons of mass destruction. As for the origin of that ominous phrase, "second Holocaust," Rosenbaum traced it back to Philip Roth's 1993 novel, Operation Shylock, where a character opines that "Arafat's final solution is the same as Hitler's: extermination," and then urges Israelis to seek safety in a Europe where (in the judgment of this same fictional character) memory of the Holocaust still acts as a bulwark against anti-Semitism.

Roth in 1993 was only toying with this incongruous idea. But Rosenbaum, ten years later, finds Roth's dark fantasy much too optimistic. Europe's own recent outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence persuade him that there is likely to be another attempt to destroy the Jewish people; the question for him "is not 'whether,' but when."

The dissemination of anti-Jewish propaganda by and within Arab and Muslim societies has lately been swifter than the spread of the Internet.

What, Me Worry?

This was the trigger that set off Wieseltier's tirade. He describes the emotional condition of American Jews in the following language:

> The community is sunk in excitability, in the imagination of disaster. There is loss of intellectual control. Death is at every Jewish door. Fear is wild. Reason is derailed. Anxiety is the supreme proof of authenticity. Imprecise and inflammatory analogies abound. Holocaust imagery is everywhere.

As it happens, however, none of the evidence Wieseltier adduces in support of this claim can compete with the claim itself for sheer "excitability." Apart from the Washington rally, and a number of other initiatives to advocate Israel's cause and help the victims of terror there, American Jews have been going about their business as usual, manifesting no more visible

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panic than has been apparent among American citizens in general in the long months after 9/11. When Boston's Jewish Community Relations Council scheduled a rally last May to coincide with the day of Holocaust remembrance, it drew only about 1,000 persons in a city of a quarter of a million Jews. The Jewish press has reported no protest suicides, no burning barricades, not even a canceled vacation.

What, then, explains Wieseltier's own overreaction? Primarily, his objection to any analogizing of European and Arab anti-Semitism would seem to rest less on issues of accuracy than on issues of political utility. In his analysis, invoking the Holocaust is a means of exaggerating the degree of hostility to Israel, and this in turn promotes and justifies a hard line against concessions to the Palestinians. The Nazi analogy, in short, denies the possibility of the "peace process." As Wieseltier writes:

> If you think that the Passover massacre [of 28 Jews in Netanya] was like Kristallnacht [November 9, 1938, the night of multiple Nazi pogroms against the Jews of Germany], then you must think that there cannot be a political solution to the conflict, and that the Palestinians have no legitimate rights or legitimate claims upon any part of the land, and that there must never be a Palestinian state, and that force is all that will ever avail Israel.

Is Wieseltier right about this? Have the Jews fallen victim to a self-fulfilling prophecy, missing the chance for reconciliation with today's Arabs by insisting on portraying them as yesterday's Nazis? After all, if it were possible to temper Arab hostility by, for example, withdrawing from the disputed territories and encouraging the creation of an Arab Palestinian state, might this not go a long way toward reaching the "peace" that Israel says it has been seeking for many long years? Would not a more forthcoming Jewish policy induce a more receptive Arab policy in turn?

The argument is, alas, all too familiar. It is exactly what produced the Oslo accords, which were designed to lead to the very settlement between Israelis and Palestinians that Wieseltier now envisions as if for the first time. In 1993, a mere nine years ago, the government of Israel invited Yasir Arafat back from exile and transferred administrative power over parts of the disputed territories to a newly appointed Palestinian Authority, expecting it to become the nucleus of an independent Arab state. At that time, the majority of American Jews, Wieseltier assertively among them, hailed the Oslo accords as the road to peace, and many actively lobbied Washington on behalf of the PLO.

The most revealing section of Wieseltier's narrative is thus the one that is missing. No one reading his words about ethnic panic would ever guess that American Jewish celebrants of the peace process had so recently danced the hora in honor of Yasir Arafat on the White House lawn. If there has indeed been a "loss of intellectual control," it is not the one that Wieseltier attributes to today's nervous Jews but that earlier orgy of hope, based as it was on political calculations that had no proven models, and on trust in those who had least earned it.

Wieseltier's failure even to mention a seminal course of events at such extreme odds with his own recitation of recent history suggests less an oversight than a cover-up, an attempt to dodge responsibility for a catastrophically misconceived policy. This is no doubt why some diehard champions of the Oslo "process" have so eagerly seized on his New Republic article. "A Bracing Response to Current Hysteria," exulted the columnist Leonard Fein, a founding member of Peace Now and, for over two decades, an enthusiastic promoter of concessions to Arafat who has yet to account for the gap between his predictions and their results. Similar obeisance was paid by Tony Judt, who as an expert in modern European history has repeatedly likened Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza to the French colonization of Algeria and attributed the lack of "credible Palestinian interlocutors" to Israel's own imperious behavior ever since its "hubris-inducing victory" of 1967.

To hold the Jews responsible for the aggression against them, as Judt does; to affirm the peaceful intentions of Arab terrorists, as Fein does; to transform American Jews who recently pimped for the PLO into paranoid hysterics of the Right, as Wieseltier does, is to disfigure political reality beyond recognition. Even if the Jews were the most rotten and misguided people on earth, they do not number 280 million in nationality (let alone one billion in religious affiliation); they

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have not organized their politics around the destruction of 21 Arab countries, or trained a generation of suicide bombers to achieve that goal; they have not used the United Nations as a medium for spreading a genocidal ideology around the globe, or their synagogues to preach "death to the Arabs!" Jews did not bomb America in the name of the Torah, or foment anti-Muslim sentiment throughout Europe.

It is certainly true that memories of the Holocaust and invocations of anti-Semitism can be used to justify militancy. They can also be used to justify pacifism, appeasement, and much else besides.

Wishful Thinking

Which brings us to another point of similarity between "then" and "now"—namely, the agitation among intellectuals not only over the relative significance of political anti-Semitism but also over the uses to which it is allegedly put by Jews themselves. During the 1930s, in the pages of the *New Republic* and elsewhere, a few Jewish intellectuals did track the danger to Jews in Europe and in Palestine, warning, in Ludwig Lewisohn's words, of "the pathological bloodthirstiness of the Nazi anti-Semitic campaign." But Lewisohn's was a minority voice. Most intellectuals urbanely mocked such apocalyptic scenarios, and some of the Jews among them worried lest their coreligionists exploit the whole issue either to further Zionist ambitions in Palestine or to resuscitate an "archaic" Jewish religion.

Today, too, when deadlier forms of anti-Semitism are on the rise, there is massive intellectual resistance to acknowledging the threat, and most political analysts still treat anti-Semitism like a hiccup that will soon give way to regular breathing. Tony Judt writes that the solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict is in plain sight: "Israel exists. The Palestinians and other Arabs will eventually accept this; many already do." He states this conclusion as though it complied with some obvious and inexorable logic, though he might as well be saying that fish will fly because they have fins and will eventually use them.

As a European historian, Judt presumably knows that the Jews of Europe also "existed," and that by 1939 many, if not most, Germans and Austrians "already" accepted their existence. Nevertheless, a dedicated minority of motivated idealists was able to cleanse their countries of the blight within an astonishingly brief period of time. Today's situation is once again arguably worse: One no longer needs to hold mass rallies in Nuremberg to spread the sort of genocidal anti-Jewish propaganda that Egyptian television carries nightly to millions of homes, and preachers who call for holy struggle against Israel are no less committed than Judt is to their sense of the inevitable. This is not to say that the Arabs will succeed, any more than that the Germans and Austrians had to succeed; it means that one cannot dismiss anti-Semitism just because it offends one's sense of rational possibility.

Nor, on similar grounds, can one dismiss the possibility of Israel's physical defeat by its Arab and Muslim enemies just because its military power is for the moment unmistakably preponderant. Even greater powers—the United States, for one—have been defeated in palpably unequal contests with lesser but more determined forces. The suicide bomber is a strategic weapon of immense effectiveness for those who feel they have expendable populations; more crucially still, the possession, imminent or actual, of weapons of mass destruction on the part of nations that have already declared their eagerness to use them against the Jewish state changes the regional balance of power definitively. And much as Israel may resemble the United States in other respects, it cannot lose a war to its enemies and necessarily expect to survive. Observers like Judt who point to Israel's defensive capabilities as evidence that it has little to fear from Arab aggression are playing a cruel game of loading up the donkey to see how much it can carry before it collapses.

Judt's views—I focus on them because they may be taken to represent the liberal academic consensus—are interesting in another respect as well: They illustrate how anti-Semitism makes inroads into the liberal mindset. In the years immediately following the creation of Israel, when Arab hostility was expected to give way "eventually" to recognition and acceptance, Israel was the beneficiary of widespread liberal sympathy. The question Western liberals posed to themselves was: How long would it take before the Arabs came to their senses, relinquished their intransigence,

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and accepted the reality of a Jewish state? But the paradoxical truth is that, the longer and more energetically the Arabs continued their aggression, the costlier it became for others—ideologically, as well as politically or militarily—to defend Israel. As the hostility escalated, it turned neutral onlookers not against the aggressors but against their intended victims.

Anti-Semitism offends Western sensibilities because it is not amenable to the kind of reasoning that we believe is innate in human beings. ("Israel exists. The Palestinians and other Arabs will eventually accept this; many already do.") In attacking Jews, the anti-Semite also attacks, by proxy, the Western belief in tolerance, and the freedoms implicit in the Rights of Man. What is a good liberal to do? He knows hostility when he sees it, and he surely does not want it directed at himself. Since confronting Arab anti-Semitism would require confronting the entire Arab world, no less than confronting German anti-Semitism once meant confronting Germany itself, liberals and democrats find it much easier to blame the rising "anger" and "frustration" of the Arabs on Israel's intransigence, and to urge Israel to concede to them.

This helps explain why anti-Semitism began to be taken seriously only after the events of September 11. As long as Israel alone was being assaulted by terror and genocidal propaganda, there was little general credence in the idea that its destruction was the point at issue. But when nineteen homicidal Arabs coordinated a sophisticated attack on New York City and the Pentagon, it became harder to deny that something was afoot in the world that transcended "normal" international behavior. Once one is prepared to acknowledge that a given act of aggression is incommensurate with any offense that may have been given, terms like evil—and anti-Semitism—become permissible.

In the case of the so-called Arab-Israel conflict, to permit the concept of anti-Semitism into the discussion is to acknowledge that the origins of Arab opposition to the Jewish state are to be located in the political culture of the Arabs themselves, and that such opposition can end only if and when that political culture changes. For some supporters of the "peace process," this post-September 11 realization hit with the force of a revelation, and it has led to much salutary rethinking of former positions. For others, alas, it clearly remains a bridge too far.

Deferring to Dictators

"Is the peril 'as great, if not greater' than the peril of the 1930s? I do not see it," writes Leon Wieseltier. The determination not to see it is what has helped make the peril greater.

Consider the case of Michael Kamber, a correspondent of the *Village Voice* who had been reporting from Pakistan just before the disappearance of Daniel Pearl. When Kamber learned of Pearl's kidnapping, he knew for a certainty that Pearl would be murdered, and he was simultaneously shaken by the realization that he himself, being the son of a Jewish father, might just as easily have been the victim. After the murder was confirmed, Kamber filed a belated column, a kind of obituary-report about this land "where anti-Semitism flows as easily as water."

Kamber's column describes Pakistan as a country of 140 million inhabitants, 98 percent Muslim and 75 percent illiterate, all of whom seem to be obsessed with Jewish iniquity:

> In interviews conducted while I was there, government officials would occasionally veer off into long diatribes about the Jews; fundamentalist religious leaders, who educate hundreds of thousands of children in the country's madrassas, spoke of little else. In Islamabad ... an elderly mullah responsible for the education of hundreds of youngsters said, "To me [the bombing of the World Trade Center] seems the design of the Jewish lobby. The Jewish lobby wants to pit Islam against Christianity.

As Kamber tells the tale, Pakistan's uneducated populace, having no personal contact with Jews and no training in independent thought, takes its cues from religious and political authorities. Those authorities, unaccustomed to assuming any responsibility for the gross deficiencies of their society, blame the "Jews" for all that they need to explain away. No distinctions are made between Jews and Israel, or indeed between

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Israel and America—except when it is politically expedient to blame Jews for what is hateful about America, too. In such a climate, writes Kamber, now justifying his decision to hide his own half-Jewish identity, "to admit to being Jewish... would have been unthinkable."

This is a very significant admission. If the effect of anti-Semitism on Michael Kamber was to inhibit any mention of his Jewish identity to others while he was in Pakistan, its effect on his published journalism, up until this final act of intellectual penance, was to inhibit any mention of a huge and central fact of life in the society he was writing about. Western journalists are paid to report accurately on reality. But the very enormity of anti-Semitism—the fact that, in certain parts of the world, politicians and clerics turn abhorrence of Jews into an essential element of their reality—creates an inclination to turn away from it, if for no other reason than to retain the good will of the anti-Semites. Thus, in the name of maintaining "access," do American journalists affirm the power of dictators to control our putatively free and open press.

An Old Problem

The problem transcends the case of Michael Kamber, and is again not a new one. When Arthur Hays Sulzberger took control of the *New York Times* in 1935, he seemed far more afraid of having it thought that he ran a "Jewish newspaper" than of the rise of Adolf Hitler. He believed that the threat of anti-Semitism was being used by some Jews as a political cover for a kind of nationalism he abhorred, and he instructed his city editor not to give "too much space" to the efforts of the American Jewish Committee to aid European Jews. When Zionist leaders charged him with failing to present the news impartially, he blamed them for turning him from a non-Zionist into an "anti-Zionist." In 1942 he wrote to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, "I am opposed to Goebbels' tactics whether or not they are confined to Nazi Germany," equating Nazi pressure on the Jews of Germany with Rabbi Silver's pressure on him.

The effect of this was to upend the stated editorial principles of the *Times*. Ostensibly, the family wanted the paper to remain evenhanded and free of bias, by which it meant that it would not allow its own Jewish origins to dictate favorable coverage of the Jews. But in practice the paper carried this to the point of creating bias: Lest it be accused of favoring the views of one side, it banned all letters to the editor concerning Hitler in the years that he was coming to power. The Ochs-Sulzbergers also believed that, since the Jews were not a people—the very claim that would one day be enshrined in the charter of the PLO—they were not in need of a Jewish homeland; and this, too, dictated a policy of minimizing anti-Semitism lest, by promoting sympathy for the Jewish plight, the *Times* play into the hands of Zionists.

Although the Ochs-Sulzberger families have since apologized for the "meager coverage" the *Times* gave to the Holocaust as it was unfolding, they have never made a connection between their prejudiced view of Jewish peoplehood and the paper's coverage of world news in general. They thus perpetuate the cycle of parochialization, as if the problem were one that affected only the Jews. But let us suppose for a moment that the publishers of the *Times* had acted truly without bias. They would then have responded to Hitler's virulent anti-Semitism as signaling a broader danger to everything precious to themselves and to America. They would have assiduously gathered information about Hitler's program of rearmament, as Winston Churchill tried to do once he became convinced that Hitler was planning to attack the West. They would have drawn daily attention to Germany's abuses of democratic freedoms, its perversion of the law, its abrogation of civil liberties. And they would have registered the way that Nazi anti-Semitism cloaked darker anti-democratic purposes behind an enmity directed against the Jews alone.

In brief, had the *Times* been truly neutral in reporting on Hitler's war against the Jews, it would have done a newspaper's proper job of ferreting out the painful but necessary truth about Hitler's war against the West. And the same holds true today, when embarrassment over Jewish causes still governs *Times* coverage of the Middle East and elsewhere, resulting in the same betrayal of professional standards. Had the

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Times been truly neutral, and doing its proper job, it would have long since reported in copious detail on the unmistakable signs of growing Arab extremism, an extremism that erupted with spectacular force in the attacks on America of September 11. The reluctance to expose dangers to the Jews suppressed recognition of much that threatened, and still threatens, the West.

Not that the *Times* is alone in this submission to anti-Semitic regimes. The same pattern prevails everywhere today in the academic community, which if anything is even more sensitive than the press to questions of "access." Scholars who work in politically controlled areas of research are rewarded for their sympathies and punished for their criticisms, sometimes in bizarre ways. A professor of ancient Middle East studies has told me that his German colleagues are embarrassed by Arabs in the places where they conduct research who congratulate them on what "they" did to the Jews; they dare not reveal their discomfort lest it prejudice their working relations with local personnel. More often, what begins as passive accommodation becomes active acquiescence. In American universities, the belief that Israel is to blame for the manifold failures of Arab society is by now such a corrupting feature of Middle East studies departments that it has assumed the status of a natural condition, like smog in Los Angeles.

Arab terrorism against Israel has exacerbated this situation without raising a peep from university administrations. Citing the difficulty of securing proper insurance coverage, Harvard recently followed the lead of other American universities in forbidding travel to Israel on Harvard funding. A longstanding archaeological dig in Israel had to be abandoned this past summer, and students and faculty had to cancel programs of study and research—this, at the very moment when Harvard is promoting a new commitment to study abroad as a direct way of learning about the world.

Meanwhile, Jewish students attending American-sponsored Arabic programs in Arab countries have been instructed not to reveal their Jewishness and have been provided with false identities: a concession to Arab anti-Semitism that has neither been officially protested by any academic official nor brought to the attention of the American public. Thus do universities casually accede to policies of genocidal hatred, all the while proclaiming their dedication to multiculturalism, pluralism, and antidiscrimination.

Anti-Semitism and Anti-Democracy

What is it that, in the end, the record of anti-Semitism in Europe suggests? It suggests that the Jews are just the warm-up act to farther-reaching political ambitions. The ease with which Hitler was able to isolate the Jews, disenfranchise them, blackmail them, and begin persecuting them gave him the confidence to expand his conquests; he used the war against the Jews to encourage his followers to flex their muscles.

Anti-Semitism in this sense is not just a generic term for discrimination against Jews or even persecution of Jews. It is not just a means of scapegoating, though it is assuredly that. Nor is it merely a projection onto Jews of the desire to dominate, to "rule the world." More precisely than any of these, modern anti-Semitism achieved its power as a political instrument through its opposition to liberal democracy itself—as personified by the Jews.

Wilhelm Marr created the League of Anti-Semites in the 1870s to save Germany from what the Jews represented. "We have among us," he said, "a flexible, tenacious, intelligent, foreign tribe that knows how to bring abstract reality into play in many different ways." By "abstract reality," Marr meant everything the Jews could be made to stand for, summarized in the freedoms—religious, political, economic—that undergird modern democratic culture.

Marr's perception of the Jews as incarnations of modernity harnessed ancient prejudice to brand-new fears in societies that were in the process of losing their religious certainties and shedding many aspects of their traditional way of life, including the sense of security provided by autocratic rule. What some Europeans were certain was progress seemed to others a mortal danger, and politicians found that they scored well when they concretized those fears in the image of the ubiquitous Jews—a small, highly adaptive people with arguably the largest image on earth, a people desperately seeking acceptance and targetable at no political cost.

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As the Jews were the practice range for anti-democratic and anti-liberal forces in pre-Hitler Europe, so in the second half of the 20th century the state of Israel took the brunt of the Arab/Muslim war against Western democracy. But, unlike the Jews of Europe, the Jews of Israel toughened under the assault, at least initially. Having acquired the means of self-defense, the Jewish state seemed to grow stronger the more it was attacked. And for a long time, in a reverse dynamic to the process I have been describing, the democratic West as a whole reaped the benefit.

"We may never know how much time Israel bought for us in our decades of negligence," writes William Bennett, "how many American lives it saved by its long-kept refusal to negotiate with or capitulate to terrorist murder and extortion, its resolve to use every means to track down, confront, and undo those who captured and killed its citizens, its crystalline message of defiance. What we do know is that all over the world, especially in the Soviet gulag and in the prisons of Eastern Europe, captive men gulped great draughts of hope whenever word filtered through of an act of Israeli rescue and punishment: palpable and too rare signals in those dark decades [of the cold war] that evil was not everywhere triumphant, everywhere accommodated, everywhere appeased."

Bennett is surely right that, apart from America itself, Israel still stands as the world's brightest model of national self-liberation based on ideals of individual responsibility and human freedom. Israel's ability to withstand Arab attempts to destroy it in one of the longest and most lopsided wars ever fought serves as an indelible testimony to the strength of democratic culture.

Israel had to be gritty; otherwise it would not exist. Nevertheless, in the 1990s it too began to tire under the perpetual assault. In systematic and sustained terrorism, the Arabs discovered the first weapon that really works against a democracy, destroying the trust, the openness, of an open society, and exploiting its precious freedoms to expose its acute vulnerability. Here once again Israel has served as a test case. How well can democracies withstand this new form of all-out foreign aggression? We know from the past that the West paid dearly for ignoring Hitler's war against the Jews. One can only hope it will not pay as dearly for having ignored or underestimated for so long the Arab war against Israel and the Jews.

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The Gamble That Failed: Israel's Withdrawal From Lebanon

timothy gordon

In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak fulfilled his election campaign promise and withdrew Israeli forces from Lebanon. Barak proclaimed the end of the "vicious cycle of tragedy in Lebanon for Israel" that had endured for almost two decades.[1] The Israeli populace and the international community strongly endorsed the move. The UN certified that Israel had fully complied with UN Resolution 425 (1978), which called for Israel to remove its forces from Lebanese territory. Yet, in retrospect, the removal of Israeli forces from Lebanon did not bring Israel closer to achieving peace and security. For although many in Israel and around the world viewed the withdrawal as a significant step in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, many in the Arab world did not share this sentiment. For them, Israel's retreat represented the first important victory over the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and a possible harbinger of even greater triumphs. The pullout encouraged both Palestinian militancy and the emergence of a significant threat on Israel's northern border. The unintended consequences of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon demonstrate that unilateral disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza Strip will only further undermine Israel's security.

Israel's Involvement in Lebanon: A Brief Summary

Israel's first extensive foray into Lebanon came in 1978 with Operation Litani, an Israeli incursion into Lebanese territory that involved almost 20,000 troops. Following their violent expulsion from Jordan in 1970–1971, Yasir Arafat and his Fatah organization established Lebanon as their base to continue attacks against Israel. By 1978, Arafat's forces had created a virtual state within a state in southern Lebanon. Terrorist attacks emanating from so-called Fatah Land made civilian life in Israel's northern region less and less bearable. Israel launched Operation Litani in response to a terrorist hijacking of an Israeli civilian bus that resulted in the deaths of 37 civilians.

While international pressure ultimately compelled Israel to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Lebanon, Israel did establish a "security zone" within Lebanese territory to protect her northern flank. The Southern Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian militia allied with Israel, assumed primary responsibility for manning this zone. But despite Operation Litani and the development of an Israeli-controlled buffer area in Lebanon, the guerilla attacks against Israel did not abate.

As a result, in June of 1982 the IDF commenced Operation Peace for Galilee, a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. The operation was designed to achieve what Operation Litani had failed to do: completely eradicate the terrorist threat from Lebanon. Yet Operation Peace for Galilee soon assumed a far more ambitious agenda—establishing a pro-Israel government in Lebanon and delivering a severe military blow to Syria, which had entered Lebanon in 1976. While Israel achieved rapid military success during the early stages of its attack, forcing the PLO to flee Lebanon and routing Syrian forces, the complexity of the ethnic and

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political situation in Lebanon ultimately undermined Israel's military gains. Israel soon found itself engulfed in sectarian chaos that pitted Druse against Christian, Christian against Muslim, and Shia against Sunni. International opposition to Israel's move intensified, particularly following the notorious massacre of over 800 Palestinian refugees by Christian militiamen in the Sabra and Shatila camps.[2] Facing a deteriorating situation in Lebanon and mounting international political pressure, Israel withdrew its forces to an expanded security zone in 1985.[3] With Israeli forces confined to this zone, Syria took control of Lebanon, beginning a military occupation that continues to this day.

During the mid-1980s, Hizbullah, a radical Shiite organization committed to ending the Israeli presence in Lebanon, emerged. Syria and Iran reached agreements for Iran to support Hizbullah with weapon shipments and advisors. Iran provided Hizbullah with the military and non-military support needed to forge a coherent and capable challenge to the IDF in Lebanon. As a recent book on Hizbullah noted, "without Iran's political, financial and logistical support, Hizbullah's military capabilities and organizational development would have been greatly retarded. By Hizbullah's own reckoning, it would have taken an additional 50 years for the movement to score the same achievements in the absence of Iranian backing."[4] With Iranian backing, Hizbullah developed sophisticated recruitment, training, intelligence, and guerilla tactics.

Hizbullah's relentless war against Israel became increasingly effective, both militarily and psychologically. The ratio of Hizbullah to IDF fatalities shifted from 5 to 1 during the 1980s and early 1990s to less than 2 to 1 during the late 1990s.[5] During the late 1990s, the IDF lost an average of 20 to 30 soldiers per year.[6] As the conflict in Lebanon began to look more and more futile, popular opposition to the Israeli presence in the security zone swelled. Israeli activists began holding a protest outside the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv following the death of any IDF soldier in Lebanon. Petitions circulated with thousands of Israeli signatures demanding IDF withdrawal. In February 1997, two Israeli helicopters ferrying troops and ammunition to Lebanon collided, killing 73 soldiers. The catastrophe represented a turning point for many Israelis in their support of an IDF presence in Lebanon. In 2000, at the time of the withdrawal, 70 percent of the Israeli populace endorsed Barak's decision to evacuate the security zone.[7]

The Decision to Withdraw

Israel made a grave miscalculation in withdrawing from Lebanon without commitments from Syria or Lebanon to prevent future Hizbullah assaults. Indeed, these countries explicitly stated they would not use their forces for this purpose. In March 2000, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud asked, "How can we protect the borders with Israel while in the Palestinian refugee camps there are tens of thousands of armed refugees who demand the right of return and who do not receive an answer?"[8] Lahoud prophesized that "a unilateral Israeli withdrawal will lead to an additional war."[9] Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Al-Shara asserted that a withdrawal "will lead Israel to suicide."[10] Syria would not allow Israel to extricate itself from the Lebanon quagmire in the absence of an Israeli agreement to return the Golan Heights to Syria. If Israel left Lebanon, Syria's proxy forces would simply shift the focus of conflict to the Israeli side of the border.

The ideology and rhetoric of Hizbullah clearly shows that the group has no intention of ending its decades-long confrontation with Israel, despite the fulfillment of the organization's original goal to drive Israel from Lebanon. As Hizbullah's leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, said in a 1997 interview with *Der Spiegel*: "Let us assume that hell freezes over and Israel does the unthinkable and withdraws from South Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Do you believe that peace and reconciliation between the Arabs and Jews will then prevail? There will be no peace or reconciliation as long as Palestine is occupied by the Zionist enemy... only our weapons and martyrs will bring peace to the region."[11] Hizbullah fundamentally rejects the legitimacy of Israel. The group sees itself as engaged in a violent struggle against the very existence of the Jewish state.[12] Even if Hizbullah refrains from military operations against Israel for a period of time for political or tactical considerations, "when the conditions will change... we will return to combat the

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enemy in Palestine and drive it from Jerusalem" asserts Abdallah Quseir, a Hizbullah member of Lebanon's parliament.[13] Hizbullah will never accept the presence of a Jewish state in any portion of Palestine.

Despite UN certification that Israel had fully complied with Resolution 425, Syria and Lebanon rejected the validity of the Israeli withdrawal. They argued that the "occupation" had not ended because Israel still retained the Shebaa Farms area, a small strip of land 14 kilometers long and two kilometers deep. Yet Israel had not seized Shebaa Farms from Lebanon, but rather from Syria during the 1967 war. The UN report on the Israeli pullout declared Shebaa Farms Syrian land and dismissed the Lebanese and Syrian claim that Syria had ceded Shebaa Farms to Lebanon and, therefore, that Israel continued to hold Lebanese territory. The refusal on the part of Syria and Lebanon to accept UN conclusions regarding Israeli compliance with Resolution 425 was startlingly hypocritical. Previously, they had seized upon Israel's non-compliance with the same resolution as a justification for armed resistance by Hizbullah. Moreover, despite its vocal and violent insistence that Israel adhere to UN resolutions, Syria itself remains in violation of UN Resolution 520 (1982), which calls for the pullout of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory. Syria apparently takes the novel position that international law involving Lebanese sovereignty applies to Israel but not Syria.

Following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, the Lebanese government refused to deploy its forces in Southern Lebanon to prevent Hizbullah attacks against Israel. In April 2002, Syrian forces redeployed its units further from the Israeli border. This troop movement left Hizbullah in complete control of Southern Lebanon. So almost twenty-five years after Operation Litani, Northern Israel finds itself once again at the mercy of guerillas based in Lebanon.[14]

Reaction in the Arab World

The Israeli withdrawal confirmed to many in the Arab world the viability of the "military option" in dealing with Israel. The Arab media savored what they perceived as a dramatic and unprecedented triumph over Israel. *The Daily Star of Beirut* heralded Hizbullah as "the first Arab force to score any sort of victory over the vaunted Israeli military."[15] Hizbullah had shown that asymmetric warfare, the use of guerilla and terrorist tactics against technologically and numerically superior opponents, could defeat the IDF and demoralize the citizens of Israel. Nasrallah proudly declared: "In order to liberate your land you don't need tanks and planes. With the examples of the martyrs you can impose your demands on the Zionist aggressors. Israel may own nuclear weapons and heavy weapons, but, by G-d, it is weaker than a spider web."[16] The Israeli withdrawal validated senior Hizbullah military commander Shikh Nabil Kauouk's assertion that "it is possible to get back occupied land without any reward for the occupier."[17] The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon occurred approximately two months before the start of the Camp David negotiations between Barak and Arafat.

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The withdrawal from Lebanon made it far less likely that Palestinian negotiators would see the need to compromise on incendiary issues such as Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled paper *Al-Heat Al-Jaded* asked "what is the message Israel delivers to the Palestinians by its withdrawal: we will not give you your rights, unless you follow this [Hizbullah] model?"[18] PA Treasury Minister, Muhammad Audi Al-Nashashibi declared, "the Lebanese have supplied the entire world with an example of steadfastness and they have taught everybody the strategy of strike after strike until the enemy's defeat. What happened in Lebanon

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is a lesson for whoever wants to win in Palestine like in Lebanon."[19] Even if the Israeli retreat from Lebanon did not convince Arafat and other Palestinian Authority negotiators at Camp David that they could achieve a similar military victory over Israel, the withdrawal undoubtedly made it more difficult for them to convince their own people of the necessity of painful concessions for peace. The negotiators decided not to take the risk of presenting a compromise solution to their people.

The Nature of the Current Threat

By abandoning Southern Lebanon to Hizbullah, Israel has left a force on its border that serves as a critical source of inspiration for Palestinian rejectionists. The ubiquity of Hizbullah flags and emblems at Palestinian gatherings during the Intifada attests to Hizbullah's hold on the Palestinian psyche.[20] Through its sophisticated media machine, Hizbullah leaders incessantly exhort Palestinian "holy warriors to be in a state of psychological, emotional and physical preparation to face [the] challenge."[21] Its satellite TV station beams images of Hizbullah's military actions against Israeli troops. Yet Hizbullah's effort to supply the Palestinians with weaponry represents a far graver threat than its moral support.

Hizbullah has played a leading role in efforts to augment and enhance Palestinian military capabilities. Many analysts believe Hizbullah assisted in coordinating the attempted Iranian shipment of 50 tons of ammunition and weaponry, including Katyusha rockets, anti-tank missiles and mines aboard the Karine-A vessel that Israeli naval commandoes intercepted in January 2002.[22] Hizbullah itself relentlessly used Katyusha rockets, which have a range of over twelve miles, to terrorize Israel's northern towns while Israeli forces were in Lebanon. Fired from the West Bank by Palestinians, Katyushas could threaten major Israeli cities and Ben Gurion airport. In March 2002, Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah "will help the Palestinians in whatever way we can" and acknowledged Hizbullah efforts to smuggle the rockets to Palestinians.[23] Israel has also captured Hizbullah operatives in the West Bank, suggesting that Hizbullah may not remain content to merely encourage and arm the Palestinians while watching from the sidelines.[24]

Hizbullah threatens Israel's security not only by its efforts to aid the Palestinians but also through its own military capabilities, which have greatly increased since the Israeli withdrawal. Current IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon stated in an August 2002 interview that the situation "that exists today in Lebanon is far graver than it was in the period when we were in the security zone."[25] Both Syrian and Iran significantly increased their aid to Hizbullah following the Israeli pullout. According to an October 2001 issue of *Janes Foreign Report*, Hizbullah's arsenal has reached "unprecedented" levels in quantity and sophistication since the Israeli withdrawal.[26] Following the withdrawal, the article states, Hizbullah stationed enhanced batteries of Katyusha rockets close to the Israeli border and deployed new longer-range rockets deeper into Lebanon. In addition, the article notes that Hizbullah has upgraded its early warning systems, anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft batteries.[27] The presence and activity of Iranian military advisors in Lebanon has also increased since the IDF departure.[28] Syria has even begun directly supplying Hizbullah with arms, including longer-range 270mm rockets with a range of over 70 kilometers.[29] Israel now faces an enemy on its northern border with a rocket arsenal that could "paralyze northern Israel" and strike targets as far south as Haifa.[30] The risk inherent in any Israel operation to eliminate this menace has risen considerably due to Hizbullah's upgraded artillery and electronic intelligence capabilities.[31]

The raids Hizbullah has launched against Israel since the withdrawal, including the kidnapping of three IDF soldiers in October 2000 as well as numerous artillery assaults, have put Israel in a dangerous predicament. Retaliation risks escalation against a heavily armed foe, while restraint means appearing weak and inviting further strikes. Some senior IDF officers have warned that with its steadily increasing military capabilities, Hizbullah may even be tempted to initiate a major military confrontation.[32]

Hizbullah also represents a threat to Israel because of the leverage it gives Israel's implacable foes, Syria and Iran. Even after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria has used Hizbullah attacks as a means of keeping military pressure on Israel and asserting its

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own regional power. Iran also utilizes Hizbullah to threaten Israel. Hizbullah represents a forward presence for the Iranian military. While Israel is over 1,000 kilometers from Iran, Iran now has a major proxy force on the Israeli border. This force serves as a deterrent against an Israeli pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities similar to the action Israel took against the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak in 1981.[33] If Israel launched such an attack against an Iranian plant, Hizbullah missiles would surely hit Israel. Both Syria and Iran could also unleash Hizbullah in order to complicate an American campaign against Iraq or other actions in the U.S. war against terror.[34] According to a front-page article appearing in *The New York Times* in September 2002, the Bush administration as well as Israeli officials harbor concerns that Hizbullah may indeed strike Israel in order to forestall an American assault on Iraq. Dennis Ross, who served as special envoy to the Middle East under Clinton, stated that "we may have to face this problem on the eve of going into Iraq. I think there is a strong impulse on the part of the Iranians and to a lesser extent the Syrians to head us off in Iraq because they fear they could be next. If suddenly there is a war waging between Israel and its neighbors, that creates pressure to deal with that issue first and shifts attention away from Iraq."[35] While a clash with Hizbullah may prove costly to Israel, especially considering the vast improvements in Hizbullah's armaments and infrastructure since the withdrawal, it is the possibility that such a confrontation could lead to a regional war involving other Arab states that represents the most serious threat to Israeli security.

An Israeli-Syrian clash triggered by the persistence of Hizbullah attacks from Lebanon could lead to another Arab-Israeli war. Israel threatened to retaliate fiercely if Hizbullah raids against Israeli targets continued after their withdrawal. David Levy, Israel's Foreign Minister at the time, warned that Lebanon would "burn" unless the guerilla attacks ceased.[36] Israel also made it clear that it would hold Syria, the real power in Lebanon, responsible if the northern border heated up.[37] Unfortunately, the withdrawal undermined Israel's deterrent power. Border skirmishes, particularly in the Shebaa Farms area, continued despite Israeli threats. In April 2000, following the death of an Israeli soldier by anti-tank missile fire from Hizbullah, IDF jets attacked a Syrian radar station in Lebanon. The raid, which resulted in three Syrian fatalities, was the first Israeli strike against Syrian positions in Lebanon since 1996.

Despite its implications for wider conflict, the Israeli counter-attack did not intimidate Syria and its proxy, Hizbullah. Israel has subsequently sent multiple diplomatic warnings to Syria concerning the danger of its Lebanon policy. Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during a July 2002 meeting in Egypt that Hizbullah is dragging Israel into a confrontation with Syria.[38] But a report in the London *Sunday Times* a few weeks later said Israel believes its warnings to Syria to reign in Hizbullah may have failed. With diplomatic options possibly exhausted, the article stated, the IDF had drawn up plans to launch an assault within Syrian territory if Hizbullah attacked Israel again. Former head of Israeli military intelligence Major-General Amos Malka said that "sooner rather than later we'll be engaged in a conflict with Syria, unless Syria changes its attitude."[39] If Israel attacked Syria directly would other Arab states, such as Iraq and Iran, come to Syria's aid? The prospects of a serious Syrian-Israeli confrontation over Lebanon grows with each new Hizbullah provocation, and the possibility that such a confrontation could result in a multinational conflagration cannot be ignored.

Implications for the Future

Even at the time of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon certain prescient observers argued that the move would not succeed. Labor Knesset member and noted moderate Ephraim Sneh, who played a leading role in developing the security zone, dismissed the pervasively cited analogy between Israel's involvement in Lebanon and America's in Vietnam. He observed that Israel risked a great deal more by leaving Lebanon than America did when it pulled out of Vietnam. "The Vietcong was not trying to conquer America," he said. "It did not engrave the Washington Monument on its symbols the way Hizbullah displays Jerusalem."[40] Moshe Arens, former Israeli Defense Minister and Foreign Minister, warned a few days after the with-

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drawal that if the Palestinians believed the reports in the Arab world that a few hundred tenacious guerilla fighters could coerce Israel into acceding to Arab demands, "our relations with them are headed for stormy weather." He noted the irony of Israel's threatening Syria with future reprisals while Syria watched Israeli forces retreat.[41] Israel cannot afford another withdrawal under fire without further eroding its deterrent power and overall security.

A unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as some politicians and commentators currently advocate, would have a catastrophic impact on Israel's deterrent power and would certainly not end Palestinian attacks against Israel. Can anyone doubt that the Palestinians, following an Israeli pullout, would soon unveil their own Shebaa Farms pretext to continue the armed struggle? Armed with the brash confidence of perceived triumph, the Palestinians would continue to utilize the tactics that led to victory, namely violence and terrorism. Israel cannot afford to disregard the ideology of groups such as Hamas, which explicitly calls for the annihilation of Israel. Nor can Israel risk disregarding the rhetoric of PA leaders, who call for an army of martyrs to liberate Jerusalem and who demand the right of return of millions of Palestinian refugees that would lead to the demographic destruction of Israel. A withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza will no more appease these parties than the withdrawal from Lebanon quenched the ambitions of Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah.

Israel cannot abandon the West Bank and Gaza and leave the terrorist infrastructure in these locations intact as it did in Lebanon. Israel should not insist on a cease-fire with Hamas and other terrorist forces as part of a peace agreement. Rather, Israel should demand that any future Palestinian government disarm and disband these groups before Israel leaves its defensive positions in the West Bank and Gaza. If these groups continue to exist following an Israeli withdrawal, they will soon resume military operations against Israel with enhanced firepower, using any available pretext. Arab states will undoubtedly seek to give the Palestinians the same caliber missile arsenal they have provided Hizbullah; indeed, they are already trying to do so. The IDF presence in the West Bank and on the Gaza-Egyptian border complicates and largely impedes these efforts. Israel could never construct a wall high enough to protect it from Katyusha missiles fired from the West Bank or Gaza.

The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was a gamble that failed. Israel must now disabuse its enemies of the notion that gripped much of the Arab world following the Israeli retreat from Lebanon—that guerilla tactics sap the strength and resolve of the Jewish state and can force Israel to surrender land in the absence of any security guarantees. Israel must reassert the quid pro quo principle underlying the land for peace formula. Israel should not simply cede land in the hope that its enemies, many of them ideologically committed to its liquidation, will simply renounce their violent ways. The lesson from the Lebanon withdrawal is clear: Israeli appeasement of radical groups and rogue states brings the Middle East closer to regional war—not to lasting peace.

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With Friends Like These Saudis on the West

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DOCUMENTS CAPTURED by Israel during its April 2002 incursion into the West Bank have proven beyond all reasonable doubt that Saudi Arabia is actively supporting Palestinian terrorism. According to Israeli intelligence officials, who publicly released the captured documents in early May, the Saudi government gave $135 million over the past 16 months to help the families of suicide bombers and to fund other aspects of the Palestinian Intifada.[1] Some of these funds made their way through the Hamas-allied Tulkarm Charity Committee, a group that provides welfare and other social services to Palestinians and is one of the chief means by which Hamas secures popular support in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Saudi Committee for Support of the Intifada Al Quds—headed by the Saudi interior minister Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz and funded by the royal family—recently raised $109.56 million for the Palestinians in a telethon, a large part of which was spent on $5000 payments to the families of suicide bombers.[2]

Saudi support for terrorism not only poses a threat to Israel, but endangers the U.S. and the rest of the world as well. Fifteen of the 19 September 11 bombers hailed from Saudi Arabia, which is also the greatest financial supporter of madrassahs, the fundamentalist Islamic schools widespread in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Yemen. The Saudis also wield great power over the character of Islam in the United States: They are the largest backers of the North American Islamic Trust, responsible for building mosques—often fundamentalist in nature—and appointing imams throughout the country.[3] The de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah, is deeply suspicious of the United States, highly critical of American friendship with Israel, and has recently warmed up relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia has also refused to allow the U.S. to use Saudi soil in a possible military campaign against Iraq, despite the fact that the bases were built with such an operation against Iraq in mind.[4]

What's in a Word?

As if these facts were not enough to illustrate the Saudis' vehement promotion of anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment, the words of their leaders leave little doubt. They serve as a powerful reminder that Israel and the United States are natural allies in the struggle against regimes that fund and glorify terror.

Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, Palestinian terror, largely in the form of suicide bombings, has claimed over 600 lives in Israel. According to a recent CNN-Time poll, suicide bombings are the form of terrorism Americans fear most, particularly since the World Trade Center bombings.[5] In comparison, Ghazi Al-Qusaibi, the Saudi ambassador to Great Britain, described suicide bombing as necessary and sanctified. In his interview with the Saudi-owned London Arabic daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, Al-Qusaibi argued that "it is the right of every man to defend his homeland by *any* means. A man who defends his homeland and dies doing so is a martyr, and in no case must we consider him a suicide [bomber]."[6] He continued, "I [too] long to die as a martyr, although I am at an age that does not allow me to carry out a martyrdom [i.e. suicide bombing] operation.... But still I hope to die as a martyr."[7]

Al-Qusaibi is not the only Saudi official to glorify suicide-bombing operations. Another Saudi official praised suicide bombers as "young men and women [who] offered their souls for the sake of freedom and independence and in defense of their religion, dignity, and family."[8]

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Such views permeate Saudi society, teaching children to admire and emulate such "martyrdom." Government-controlled newspapers, such as *Al-Jazirah,* often applaud Palestinian suicide bombers and thereby set them up as role models. In an April 1, 2002 article praising the "Passover Massacre" bombing in the Netanya Park Hotel—an attack that killed twenty-seven people—columnist Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Al-Sa'adat wrote of the assailant: "You entered silently, with the faith and confidence with which Allah inspired you...then Allah decreed for you a martyr's death. What heroism, courage, and strength—almost unmatched on the face of the earth!"[9] In another article, Dr. Al-Sa'adat added his own praise for 'Abd Al-Baseet 'Oudeh, the suicide bomber at the Park Hotel. He wrote: "You defended your religion, your homeland, and your people. You attached no importance to [any] Arab summit; you did not wait for international agreements.... You knew that the hand of Allah is supreme, that the soul-sacrifice is the highest form of Jihad, and that he who sacrifices reaches the highest level of Paradise."[10]

Dr. Mohammad T. Al Rasheed, in another article in the Saudi government English daily *The Saudi Gazette*, has described suicide bombers as "martyrs to their cause, their honor, their dignity, their land, and their religion."[11] Glorification of suicide bombings in the Saudi press is indicative of the threat Saudi Arabia poses to Israel, to the United States, and to Western values generally.

As previously noted, it is common for the families of suicide bombers to receive large monetary compensation—or better said, reward—for the "sacrifice" made by their relatives. While Saudi officials angrily dismissed the evidence released by Israel that accused them of "financing Palestinian terrorist groups," they did not dispute further Israeli claims that large sums of Saudi money go to the families of suicide bombers. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal acknowledged that "the families of the bombers have benefited from millions in Saudi aid."[12] Saudi ambassador to England Ghazi Al-Qusaibi said that he "approve[s] of the aid going to the families of the martyrs.... This is what Saudi Arabia is doing."[13] Further, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a 57-state summit held in June of this year, called on its member states to "award scholarships to Palestinian students wounded during the Al-Aqsa Intifada as well as to other students from the families of martyrs of the Intifada."[14]

Telethons like those in support of the Palestinian uprising, where over $100 million was raised, generate remarkable anti-Israel sentiment.[15] At the telethon, a six-year-old Saudi boy donated his own set of plastic toy explosives to be used in Israel, illustrating the pervasiveness of this sentiment.[16] Such telethons are often backed by the Saudi government, including one on April 12, 2002, which raised over $85 million.[17] By providing money to fuel Palestinian violence against Israeli citizens, Saudi Arabia itself becomes an active participant in Palestinian terror.

According to an article in the Saudi daily Al-Riyadh, *"Arab infants—before they reach the age of self-humiliation and submission—sucked hatred of the Zionist enemy with their mothers' milk... However firm the handshakes, their hearts are full of hatred, their souls are full of rage...."*

Pervasive anti-Semitism in the Saudi media, whether government-controlled or merely government-regulated, undoubtedly has an impact on Saudi society, forging a nation hostile to the very notion of Israel's existence. An article in the Saudi daily *Al-Riyadh* explains that no peace agreements can end the Palestinian uprising, because "Arab infants—before they reach the age of self-humiliation and submission—sucked hatred of the Zionist enemy with their mothers' milk, and this hatred cannot be uprooted despite all the talk about false peace agreements... However warm the kisses, and however firm the handshakes, their hearts are full of hatred, their souls are full of rage, and their eyes glance away with loathing at the sight of the flag of the Zionist entity flying in the heart of [some] Arab capitals."[18] Saudi ambassador to England Ghazi Al-Qusaibi went so far as to express the possibility of

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war with Israel despite existing peace agreements; as he said, "since when have peace agreements deterred *us*?"[19]

In addition to political and economic tactics aimed at encouraging or glorifying terrorism against Israel, many Middle Eastern countries have put significant efforts into media campaigns to demonize Israel and incite their people to violence. For instance, on June 22, 2002, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq allocated $22 million to a media campaign "to denounce Israel's racist policies."[20]

Ambassador Al-Qusaibi had said that he fully supports suicide-bombing operations against Israel, for "when the culture of martyrdom spreads among the Palestinians and the Arabs, the myth of Israel will come to an end."[21] Al-Qusaibi thus clearly desires the eventual destruction of the state of Israel, as he refuses to acknowledge even its current existence. This stands in rather stark contrast to the recent Saudi "peace" proposal, in which Crown Prince Abdullah seemed willing to recognize Israel's existence (although not necessarily end the incitement of terror against this newly recognized state). However, Abdullah's true intention was not to recognize the State of Israel as much as it was to set out conditions that, if met, would bring about its destruction—i.e. the right of return. Despite any hopes for Saudi support of peace, the Saudi government continues to openly assert that "the land on which [Israel] sits is usurped" and not its own.[22]

Twin Enemies

Saudi Arabia's dangerous tolerance of terrorism and support of militant ideologies extends beyond its position on Israel. In addition to frequent burning of American flags and effigies of U.S. leaders, anti-American propaganda in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, commonly reaches the levels of anti-Israeli propaganda. Although one senior Saudi government official described the 15 Saudi hijackers as "just bodies" in someone else's plot (namely the CIA or the Mossad),[23] Abdullah Bin Matruk Al-Haddal, an official in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Saudi Arabia, praised the heroic acts of Osama bin Laden. "America doesn't want to have any competitors," he said. "Osama bin Laden's demands are the demands of his nation. The nation who gave rise to Osama bin Laden is a strong and great nation. It is the nation of the future."[24]

Now, a year after the September 11 attacks, many Saudis continue to celebrate and look up to the "Fifteen," as the hijackers are commonly known. Ghazi al Gamdhi, a 22-year-old university student, said that "their friends are really proud of them. They think the Fifteen were protecting Islam. Most of the guys here want to become heroes protecting Islam."[25] Students at the Jeddah business school, when asked about their feelings regarding September 11, said that they were happy "because America got a wake-up call."[26]

Also, despite official support of the American war on terror, the Saudis have been less than cooperative. The Saudi government has not effectively yielded to U.S. efforts to choke off huge sums of Saudi money that flow to terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. And even though the Saudi regime allowed the U.S. to use American Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at the Prince Sultan base in the war against the Taliban, it did not allow American bombers to fly combat missions from these bases.[27]

Given the powerful anti-American and anti-Western sentiment propagated by the Saudi elite, it is not surprising that fifteen out of nineteen hijackers on September 11 were Saudis. According to Stephen Schwartz, author of an upcoming book about the puritanical and often intolerant Islam of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi royal family chose the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect to dictate the rules of religious life in Saudi Arabia. These clerics do not only preach Islamic fundamentalism to their followers, they also teach hatred of the West, and specifically the United States.[28] Schwartz points out that almost every major terrorist attack against the West in recent years has been carried out by Wahhabists. "Bin Laden is a Wahhabi. So are [many of the] suicide bombers in Israel. So are his Egyptian allies, who exulted as they stabbed foreign tourists to death at Luxor.... So are the Algerian terrorists.... So are the Taliban-style guerillas in Kashmir."[29] And although it is important to fight Bin Laden and the Al-

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Qaeda, to protect the world from suicide bombers, and to condemn Algerian terrorists, it is even more important to recognize from where their hatred and violence stem: Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabism, which *Newsweek* reporter Fareed Zakaria called "the real source of modern Islamic terrorism."[30]

Despite an overwhelming degree of evidence linking Saudi Arabia to a world-wide network of terrorism, the United States shamefully continues to regard this Gulf nation as an important ally. According to the State Department, "the United States and Saudi Arabia enjoy excellent relations" and share a "broad array of interests."[31]

Shifting Tides

While the U.S. government seems willing to overlook the true nature of Saudi Arabia, a growing number of Americans are now beginning to question this alliance. Today, only 32 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of Saudi Arabia, which is down from 60 percent during the Gulf War.[32] Rudolph Giuliani, as mayor of New York, refused to accept a donation to the city from the Saudi prince on the heels of the September 11 attacks. Relatives of 9/11 victims issued a lawsuit against Saudi officials, banks, and charities, claiming that "they helped finance Osama bin Laden's network and the terror attacks."[33] And recently, in a report to the Defense Advisory Board by Laurent Murwiec, an analyst from the Rand Corporation, Saudi Arabia was portrayed as an enemy of the United States. According to the report, "the Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader.... Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies."[34]

Although the State Department was quick to distance itself from Murwiec's report, there are some signs that the government's trust of the Saudis is waning. The INS has severely tightened the visa process for Saudis, raising the refusal rate to 10 percent, up from the 3 percent prior to September 11.[35] The U.S. has also begun to make its plans for a possible war against Iraq, without Saudi Arabia, mainly due to Saudi reluctance to aid its American ally.

The U.S. must realize that despite its past alliance with the Saudi royal family, there is no longer the need to appease the Saudis and ignore their overt support of terrorism. Saudi Arabia provides only 8 percent of oil consumed by Americans, and just 15 percent of its crude-oil imports—less than half the amount the U.S. imports from Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela combined. This is far less, proportionally, than the 25 percent the U.S. imported from Saudi Arabia in 1973. And with strong markets opening up in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, there is increasingly less need to rely on this alliance.[36] Scientific advances in the search for alternative fuel sources will also decrease the degree of American reliance on foreign (or any) oil.

There is only one country in the Middle East which has unilaterally supported the U.S. war on terror and the possible war with Iraq—Israel. Israel has long known that Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab states in the Middle East, condones, finances, and otherwise supports terrorism. It is now up to the U.S. to realize that it must trust only those who have earned that trust—not Saudi Arabia, which has spent billions of dollars funding anti-American and anti-Israel terrorist groups and helped establish radical schools worldwide that foment Islamic militancy.[37] The U.S. can only trust its true allies, regimes that share its vision of peace and democracy. There is one state in the Middle East whose interests and goals are intertwined with those of the U.S.. That state is Israel.

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Oslo and Beyond:
An Interview with Colonel Daniel Reisner
Head of the International Law Branch of the IDF Legal Division

How were you involved in the Oslo negotiations?

My official position is head of the international law branch of the IDF legal division. I've been in this position for over seven years, and working in the department for 17 years. My first involvement in the peace process happened just after the Madrid conference in 1991, and became intense in 1994. Since 1996, I've been the lead advisor to the government in all of the negotiations with the Palestinians.

What in your view led to the breakdown of Oslo?

The Oslo framework was as follows. Israel and the Palestinians said, "Let's try to come up with a plan, test it for five years, and hopefully afterwards both sides will have enough confidence by the end that they will agree to some kind of serious compromise with one another." Both Palestinians and Israelis believed that the end of the five years would bring about a Palestinian state, with Israel having returned to its pre-1967 borders.

The years from 1993 to 1999 were devoted to discussions, and as planned we didn't touch upon the big issues until 1999. When we came to the negotiating table, however, both sides came with a slightly different background from those they had in 1993. Both sides came with much more distrust. That may seem strange, since in 1994 there was no history of open talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Yet the two sides that met from 1999 onwards were much more cynical. Both had strong claims that the other had violated the agreement. For Israel, it was the fact that suicide attacks had continued during those years despite the Palestinians' pledge to stop them.

What struck me about the Camp David negotiations is that we weren't talking out of the same book. Israel thought that the focus of the negotiations would be on the question of territory, including the settlements, borders, and Jerusalem. The other questions on the table were security and refugees. We thought that these issues were difficult but solvable, and we went in prepared to make concessions.

From the Palestinian perspective, though, other issues were more difficult. Consider security. In my eyes at least, this was one of the least problematic questions. Israel realized that there were three levels of security threats: terrorism, a possible war on the Eastern front, and regional threats like Iran and Iraq. We went in feeling strongly that an agreement with the Palestinians could not diminish our security. We therefore demanded that they do everything in their power to protect us against terrorism. We also stipulated that they could not have a standing army, because a Palestinian state could potentially become a hostile neighboring country. Finally, we asked for the right to build bases on Palestinian territory and to pass through that territory for military purposes if necessary, namely in the case of a large-scale war. We expected, of course, that the Palestinians would say yes to these things, because in our view they were not very difficult and were reasonable concessions to make in exchange for sovereignty.

Yet the Palestinians responded by saying: "We also have security concerns, and our main security concern is you. So we need the capability to be able to defend ourselves against you."

Second, they said, "We appreciate that you may need to fight a war on the eastern front, but if we allowed you to travel through our territory, we would be considered collaborators, and no Arab country has or will ever sign an agreement that allows that. Therefore, you may not have bases on Palestinian soil and you may not travel

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through our state in wartime."

In other words, the more we discussed these issues, the more unbridgeable our differences seemed.

The other element of the failure of the Accords was Palestinian leadership and its perception of Israel. Palestinian leadership is basically Arafat. Thus the only way we could have reached an agreement is if Arafat concluded he had no other choice but to negotiate with us. But he did have another choice: violence. Time after time, Israel has made concessions in response to force, and Arafat was fully aware of this. In other words, Israel has a weak belly; we can't stand up to too much conflict. So it's not surprising that when we arrived at Camp David, Arafat didn't feel that he had been put into a corner with no exit. He still had the use of force at his disposal. He didn't feel it was either this agreement or nothing, and so he didn't choose the agreement.

The negotiations failed because of four factors, then: the lack of trust, a history of noncompliance, huge substantive differences on the issues, and the fact that Arafat simply wasn't ready to make a deal. Just one of these factors alone would have been enough to ruin the process.

Was one side more willing to compromise than the other at Camp David?

There is no doubt that the Palestinians were in no mood for concessions. Take the issue of Jerusalem. There are three main points of contention here: the eastern part, the old city, and the Temple Mount. Concerning the Temple Mount, Clinton thought he had figured out that Israel's real interests were underground, and not on the mountaintop itself.[1] He therefore suggested that Palestinians control the area above ground and that Israel control what is underground. Yet the Palestinians said they wanted all or nothing, and that the entire area had to be theirs.

Concerning the old city, too, there were suggestions to split sovereignty in half, giving two quarters to each. Yet again, the Palestinians said no, insisting that all quarters be under Palestinian control.

In all of the negotiations I participated in, Israel always came up with concrete proposals, including numbers and concessions, while the Palestinians insisted on gaining all or nothing. The reason for this is two-fold. First, they did not have a mandate from Arafat. Second, and more importantly, a hard-line negotiator who doesn't budge will gain more in negotiations against an opponent who likes to give in and compromise. Israel was always suggesting, and never received suggestions back. Even when the Palestinians made miniscule movements, you could see they were just going through the motions. They realized that an uncompromising strategy would gain them more in the end, because Israel was ready to do far more to achieve a final agreement.

The Palestinians have a response to this criticism, of course. They say that the very existence of the state of Israel is a significant compromise. In other words, in their minds, they've already done all the compromising they'll ever need to do.

Do you still think that the end of the conflict will be reached through negotiations?

I think that while we can never know what life will bring, the best possible outcome will be from negotiations. This is because only negotiations can maximize interests. When two sides meet and hold a discussion about what they each really want, the interests of both sides will be optimized. The random decisions of one side or the other cannot accomplish this.

At this juncture, though, a negotiated outcome seems far away. We are still figuring out who our partners are. There clearly needs to be a change in Palestinian leadership for future negotiations to take place.

What about Palestinian claims that Israel reneged on Oslo?

This begins to sound like a domestic dispute: Each one claims that the other started it. We argue that we couldn't fulfill our end of the agreement because of Palestinian terrorism. Palestinians claim that we merely wanted an excuse not to fulfill our end of the agreement, because we didn't want to fill it in the first place.

But what were the Palestinians expected to do? We gave them power, territory, authority, money—we transferred everything to them. All they were supposed to do in return was to administer the Palestinian population and

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to fight terrorism. The first they did do, though not terribly well, but that wasn't of great concern to us. What was of great concern to us was terrorism, and they didn't do anything to fight against it. In fact, we realized that not only were they not fighting it, they were actually cultivating terrorist organizations themselves.

Remember that we did carry out two of the three proposed redeployments from West Bank. Each time we did this, though, Palestinian terrorism increased. As a result, we did not carry out the third. We couldn't possibly have filled this end of the agreement until the Palestinians filled theirs by stopping the violence.

What would it take for negotiations to succeed in the future?

Israel must have a partner who sees the big picture and is willing to compromise for the ultimate goal of peace. If peace with Israel is viewed as just one step in a process through which they will achieve bigger goals, then negotiations are obviously pointless. The next generation of leaders must seek to end the conflict, and must be willing to make concessions to do so.

How do you explain the extreme scarcity of Israel supporters in the international arena?

I would say that Israel's lack of popularity stems from two factors. First, we are losing the media war. It's easy to take the side of the underdog, and to most people the Palestinians appear to be the underdog. But the story here is in fact very complex, too complex for average people to understand without time and patience. Most people base their positions on sound bites. Take the example of the settlements, one of the weapons often used against Israel. It takes a long time to explain Israeli settlements to the uninitiated—what they mean and what the forces behind them are. But to say simply that Israel is building settlements in occupied territories makes for a good sound bite. Short stories and strong pictures make a better impact in the media. Our side takes longer to explain and demands more depth. It's very difficult to do this on camera and very few people have the patience to listen.

Second, while there is a current trend to blame everything on anti-Semitism, I think one must differentiate between countries and people, and that countries aren't anti-Semitic, they're just self-interested. They base their politics not on what's right but on their interests and whom they want to support. Yet who would really want to support Israel? Most countries see us as a troublemaker, and they think life would be easier without us.

Given this assessment, are you worried about the increasing power of multi-national institutions and their impact on Israel?

First of all, while it's true that more power is moving to multi-national organizations, the major superpowers like the United States and China are still unwilling to give up their sovereignty, and this presents a major limitation to their growth.

Yet while the UN is not as powerful it could be, it has still done a good deal of harm to Israel. Multi-national organizations reflect the interests of the countries that have power in them. Arab states have a great deal of power in the UN. It's therefore no surprise that there are so many anti-Israel resolutions passed.

In short, because Israel is so small, and with few friends, it's obvious that the more the political arena is put in an international perspective, the worse our situation will be.

The International Criminal Court, for example, has the potential to become a focus for Israel-bashing, as the UN has been. Most people don't want to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within confines of the court, but one could easily see it moving in that direction.

So I would say that the sooner we manage to solve our conflict, the better our life in the international arena will be, and the better our life in general will be. But I'm sorry to say that I can't foresee that happening in the near future.

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Before the Occupation

david wollenberg

Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Michael Oren
(Oxford University Press, 2002. $30.00. 419pp.)

"IT'S THE OCCUPATION, STUPID!"—or so read a sign at a pro-Palestinian rally earlier this year in Washington, DC, officially entitled the "Stop the War Mobilization." The event was jointly sponsored by a number of groups, such as the 'National Youth and Student Peace Coalition' and the 'National Coalition for Peace and Justice,' who have banded together, largely in reaction to September 11, to oppose wars of any kind, including a military response to last fall's events. "War will not make us safe," they argue, and they deplore its continued use as a means of achieving political ends.

Unless, of course, one is talking about the Palestinian intifada, which they claim remains a legitimate uprising despite its inherently violent nature. The "war on terrorism" must stop, we are told, because it will only breed more terror and hatred, but the Palestinian intifada must continue until it achieves its political ends. This contradiction is especially bizarre given that most Israelis and Palestinians hope for an eventual return to the negotiating table to continue the stalled diplomatic process, while it remains extremely doubtful that America could ever sit down with Bin Laden & Co. and reach an agreement that would satisfy both sides.

To defend the intifada, so-called "peace" activists have adopted the vilest language possible in their criticism of Israel. 'Genocide,' 'ethnic cleansing,' 'apartheid,' 'Nazism'—every slur imaginable has been used to claim how terrible Israeli rule has been for Palestinians in the disputed territories, and how "stupid" anyone who doesn't support the current Palestinian uprising must be. Never mind that prior to the start of the intifada, Palestinians in the West Bank had a per capita income almost three times that of Egypt (not to mention a lower infant mortality rate, longer average lifespan, and better rate of education and literacy than almost any Arab state): They had no other option, allegedly, except to abandon diplomacy and revolt to free the occupied territories of Israelis.

This term, "occupied territories," typically includes Gaza, the 'West Bank,' and 'East Jerusalem'—areas of land neighboring Israel's June 4, 1967, borders. However, these borders, which mark the ceasefire lines of the 1948 Arab invasion, have no historical legitimacy. They were not intended by the United Nations or by Israel's founders. Even more significantly, no Arab state recognized them as legitimate at the time (then again, no Arab state recognized Israel as legitimate at the time, and most continue not to). We are told that peace will come if Israel returns to these lines, this despite the fact that not one of the three primary sponsors of suicide bombers—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Arafat's Fatah—recognizes these borders as legitimate, and all call specifically for violence to bring about the complete destruction of the entire Jewish state.

Benjamin Netanyahu once remarked that those who simply call for a return to the old borders "have an understanding of history that goes back to the breakfast table," that the "occupation" is isolated out of its historical context. For such people, history seemingly does not exist before June 10, 1967; they see only imperialism in Israel's presence in these lands, and forget—or conveniently ignore—just how and why these areas came under Israel's control in the first place. A welcome antidote to such historical short-sightedness is Michael Oren's *Six Days of War*, a careful dissection of 1967's Six-Day War—or, as many Arabs prefer to call it, the "June War" or Al-Naksah ("the setback"). Oren has conducted extensive research using recently released Israeli, American, and Russian gov-

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ernment documents, exclusive interviews in Hebrew, English, Russian, French, and Arabic, and other primary and secondary materials in these languages to provide the most detailed account of the war ever written. Though Oren draws on sources collected in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the Arab archives unfortunately remain largely closed. Until they become public, Oren's book will most likely remain unmatched as an examination of this seminal event.

Although a great deal has been written on this momentous week in history, previous chronicles of the war tended to be either politically motivated toward one side of the conflict or the other, or more focused on the military aspects of the event itself, ignoring the international political maneuvering probably more interesting to the lay reader. Oren has sought to create a portrayal that is complete in its depictions of both the battlefields and the war room—on all sides. A full chapter is dedicated to each day of the war, and the scene flashes from Jerusalem to Amman to Cairo to Washington, providing the complexity and suspense of a motion picture. At the same time, the sheer quantity of information provided is invaluable for any reader interested in the region or simply in the workings of diplomacy itself.

The strength of the book, fittingly, is in its description of each of the six days themselves. One goes through each day of the war with a comprehensive feeling of understanding of what each major player experienced. The flip side of this close focus, of course, is the de-emphasis of the war's historical context and its consequences. Of the book's 330 pages of text, only about thirty are dedicated to history before 1967 and closer to twenty are spent describing the aftereffects. Both topics, of course, really require books unto themselves, yet Oren could have easily brought to light the relevance of this war to the current conflict had he chosen to make the appropriate comparisons. In fact, given Oren's choice of subtitle, "June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East," the final chapter of the book seems rather lacking, as the reader is presented with only cursory information about the major players' futures, and the politics that would lead up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War and eventually to the present day. Oren remarks in his foreword that his major goal was "simply, to understand how an event as immensely influential as this war came about—to show the context from which it sprang." But while Oren does provide a brief history of the conflict up to that point and a few events in particular that he feels created an aura of mistrust in June 1967, he ignores the larger issue, which is the mindset of the Arab governments, the *weltanschauung* of belligerency and hatred that could not tolerate the idea of any Jewish presence in the Middle East. In the history of this war, we see the shadows of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.

Bravado and Recklessness

Almost twenty years after its independence, no Arab state was willing to recognize Israel or come to terms with its existence. Israel in 1967 was unable to avoid terrorism even before any Gaza/West Bank occupation—Hamas, Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had all been founded and were already using violent means to accomplish their stated goals. As is true today, common hatred of Israel was the only issue that could unite Arab states, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser happily used such rhetoric to try to establish himself as the leader of the Arab world. The day would come soon, he promised, when all of Palestine would be liberated. Noticeably absent, however, was any talk of creating a Palestinian state. Egypt had no intention of relinquishing its grip on the Gaza Strip, nor did Jordan's King Hussein want to give up the West Bank. Both had taken control of these territories in 1948, and their presence on Israel's borders provided the Jewish state with a permanent sense of insecurity. Israel had no outlet to the outside world other than by air and sea, and only imaginary lines as physical borders to the north, east, and south.

Consequently, Egypt's closing of the Straits of Tiran on May 22 to 23, 1967, left Israel in a state of panic. By blockading international waterways and cutting off Israel's oil supply, Egypt had effectively declared war on Israel's very existence. The closing, however, had not happened in isolation. Tension had been building for years, and had accelerated over the previous few weeks. But for Oren, it was not the events on the ground but rather the atmosphere of rhetoric, in no small measure spurred by the Soviets, which made

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it impossible to turn the tide away from war. Arab governments played a game of one-upsmanship in pomp and bombast to show just who hated Israel the most and just how severe the destruction would be when the final battle came. Nasser promised to "liberate Palestine in a revolutionary and not a traditional manner." Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zu'ayyin proclaimed that "any Israeli movement will result in a final grave for Israel." No one wanted to be seen as soft on Israel. Nasser refused to abandon his stature of Arab leadership to the increasingly belligerent Syrians, and Jordan's King Hussein did not want to be seen as a coward. Thus, small events of violence, followed by Israeli military reactions, quickly catapulted into a full-blown war that was in no country's self-interest at the time.

But was war inevitable? Oren leaps from Israeli to Egyptian to American war rooms, showing what efforts all three made to try to avoid the outbreak of fighting. In all three camps, the governments were divided between the diplomatic and military leaders. In Israel and in America, the military men tended to favor war, while the men in charge—especially Lyndon Johnson and Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol—tried to find ways to avoid it. The opposite was true in Egypt, where Nasser's generals argued that they had neither the troops nor the arms to fight the Israeli military which, while smaller, was better equipped. Moreover, thousands of Egyptian troops were currently fighting in Yemen, and the ones in Sinai were generally poorly trained with an officer corps built on patronage rather than ability. But Nasser was unable to back down from Syrian taunts. Syria, protected most closely by the USSR, had been bombarding northern Israeli towns for months, but Israel had largely been afraid to strike back too hard for fear of facing the Soviets' wrath.

Unfortunately for them, Arab leaders seemed to have had great difficulty distinguishing between their rhetoric and reality. Oren recounts many of the Arabs' opening moves in the war as a series of power grabs, absurd almost to the point of comedy. Nasser, tired of being mocked by the Syrians for his unwillingness to back up his anti-Israel rhetoric with military action, declared to the world that he wanted an immediate evacuation of the UN Emergency Force in Sinai (located there as a buffer between the two sides). To the surprise of the world, and most particularly Nasser, Secretary-General U Thant had the entire peninsula evacuated within two days. The Egyptian president was therefore forced to carry out his threat and move his troops up to the Israeli border, at which point he had "no choice" but to blockade the Straits.

Nasser proclaimed that he was ready for war. When U Thant traveled to Cairo to attempt to change the Egyptian position, Nasser said to him, "My Generals tell me we will win...What would you say to them?"—as if the worthiness of defeating Israel was self-evident. But Nasser's generals were unwilling to say anything else, even after the war began. When Egypt's air force was all but wiped out on the morning of June 5, Nasser was not only spared the news, he was told fairy tales of overwhelming success: that the Israelis had lost 75 percent of its air power, and that the Egyptians were launching an offensive from Sinai. Radio Cairo declared "our airplanes and our missiles are at this moment shelling all Israel's towns and villages," and that soon Arab armies would be marching on Tel Aviv. No one was willing to tell Nasser the truth, and the stories of success soon spread throughout the Arab world. Thus King Hussein received with suspicion a note from the Israelis telling him that Israel would not attack him unless he initiated hostilities, and assumed it was proof of Israeli weakness. Having been labeled a traitor for years by the other Arab states for his unwillingness to take a hard-line stance on the Zionist enemy, Hussein launched his attack on Israel, a move that would quickly cost him the entire West Bank.

When the actual devastation of the war was finally revealed, the Arab states immediately found a scapegoat, claiming that the Americans and British had

Arab governments played a game of one-upmanship to show just who opposed Israel the most. Thus small events quickly catapulted into a full-blown war.

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launched an attack from the sea. The fabrication backfired, resulting in a loss of trust not only from the Americans, who had tried to maintain a state of neutrality before the war, but also from the Arabs' Soviet allies, who were unwilling to come to their aid for fear of having to fight a war against the West.

Oren does his best to tell the story of the war from every side, and it is through his level of detail, especially in dialogue, that the characters come to life. At times, the mass of Israeli material often creates the impression of this being the 'main' storyline, although this is not to say that the book is biased toward the Israeli perspective. Just as Arab militancy and anti-Israel rhetoric scared the Israelis into military actions in the period before the war, the results of such actions are rarely portrayed as having improved Israel's defensive situation, and often seem to have pushed Arab leaders to go one step further in response. Those leaders hesitant to rush into battle, like Eshkol, are generally portrayed as the heroes of the war, while those less concerned with diplomacy, like Labor Minister Yigal Allon, tend to be portrayed as overly hawkish and impatient. Nonetheless, the book will go far to silence the revisionist historians who have tried to label the war an act of Israeli aggression. While popular opinion and Arab pressure may have forced Nasser and Hussein into a war that for which their militaries were not quite ready, they were clearly responsible for fomenting the hatred of Israel that forced them into a state of belligerency in the first place. For it is clear that even if the Arab states were willing to negotiate with Israel before the war—which of course they weren't—Israel would have had little to offer. There had been no immediate *causus belli*, no clear goals for the war (other than Israel's complete destruction), no willingness to accept any pleas for peace, and no acceptance of international mediation. In effect, Oren makes clear that there had been nothing but rage and madness—and there was nothing Israel could do to assuage the other side and prevent the fighting.

Old Habits Die Hard

It is this need for constant self-defense against irrational and rejectionist neighbors that links the Israel of 1967 with that of 2002. After reading Oren's book, one is unfortunately left with a nagging feeling that very little has changed in the thirty-five years since. Many of the names are the same, of course. Some—Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, and until very recently Shimon Peres—remain in positions of power, while others—Hafez Assad, King Hussein, Yitzhak Rabin, Rehavam Ze'evi—have only just passed away. But more disturbing still is just how little has changed politically. While Israel has formally made peace with two of its enemies, Egypt and Jordan, Syria continues to encourage terror and violence, with financial support from Iraq and Iran. Most Arab states remain officially in a state of war with Israel, and, as stated earlier, there are still groups who pledge to fight until Israel's eradication. And while it would seem at least on the surface that the Palestinian intifada has more immediate goals than the Arab armies of the 1960s, Israel still must deal with an adversary who will not be pacified, and who acts more out of fury than from reason.

The legacy of dishonesty continues, again with disastrous results. Arafat denied any connection to or knowledge of the Karine-A—the arms vessel captured sailing to Gaza with tons of Iranian weapons—until it was proven that he had authorized its payment. Much of President Bush's intolerance of Arafat is a result of Arafat's lies during the event. When Israeli troops entered the West Bank city of Jenin in April of this year, official Palestinian sources claimed that "hundreds, possibly thousands" had been massacred by Israel, only to later admit that there had been no massacre and a few dozen had died in the fight at most. When Israel entered the city again a few months later, media sources were far more reluctant to believe PA claims. Financial documents in support of the terror attacks were discovered bearing Arafat's signature, after he had declared he was doing his utmost to end the violence, leaving the EU to wonder how their billions of dollars in aid were being spent (although they continue to send the money). Arafat has proven himself unwilling to use any other tool but violence to settle the decades-old struggle, and Israel is left with few options. Israel can choose not to fight, but it cannot choose not to be fought against.

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Of course, the man at the rally holding his "It's the Occupation, Stupid!" sign would disagree. There are many like him who still believe that the solution is simple, that if Israel returned to its pre-war lines then there would be no more reason to revolt. But what is painfully obvious when reading Oren's book and considering the present day is that the violence has never been driven by logical analysis. The presence of a few Jewish settlers outside the so-called 'green line' cannot explain the intifada, let alone justify its violence. If the PA's goals were simply independent statehood, there would clearly be more effective means than an armed rebellion that the Palestinians could never hope to win. But the struggle to rid the West Bank and Gaza of Jews is a microcosm of the former undertaking to rid them from the entire region. And it is equally irrational. While the pronounced goals of the violence may have changed, feelings toward Israel have not. There is little reason to believe that a return to the status quo pre-1967 will be any more peaceful than the present. Oren writes toward the end of the book:

> The 1967 war...had changed the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not by making Israel any less repugnant to the Arabs, but by convincing them that it could never be eliminated by force of arms. Many Israeli leaders shared [this] conviction, and some went even further, believing that for the first time peace was attainable, if purchased with Arab territories.

The Israeli cabinet would first decide to exchange land for peace on June 19, 1967, and Ehud Barak would try again, still unsuccessfully, with Syria and the PA in July of 2000. For many Israelis, this dream of peace through negotiation has faded away. As long as hatred is taught in Arab schools and savagery is glorified as virtue, no real end to the violence can come, occupation or no. It is hatred that brought violence to the region in 1967 and in 2002, and it will continue to do so in the future. Only a fundamental change in worldview can bring peace—this is the sad lesson of history.

David Wollenberg, Harvard Class of 2003, is from Short Hills, New Jersey.

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HIR Background Notes: Israel and the United Nations

1945: The UN is born

In the aftermath of World War II, representatives of 50 countries convened in San Francisco to compose the United Nations (UN) Charter. On October 24, the majority of these countries ratified the charter and the UN was officially born. The UN was founded on the principle of the "sovereign equality among nations," with the goal of promoting peaceful resolutions of conflicts between member nations.

1947: The UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181)

Exasperated by increasing hostilities in Palestine, the British government relinquished its Mandate and turned the issue of settlement over to the United Nations. On November 19, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 181, partitioning Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. The Zionist leadership accepted the proposal and, one day before the British were to relinquish their mandate, proclaimed the independent State of Israel. Arab leadership, however, rejected the partition plan and attacked Israel in the hopes of destroying it.

1949: Israel is admitted into the UN

Israel applied for membership first in the fall of 1948, but was rejected by the Security Council. She reapplied and was accepted the following spring after signing armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon.

1950: The UN Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

After Israel's war of independence, two refugee problems were created. Approximately 470,000 Jews fled their ancestral homes in the Arab world to escape anti-Semitic violence and discrimination. At the same time, nearly 500,000 Arabs fled Israel to the surrounding Arab countries. Israel integrated the Jewish refugees, as well as the Arabs who had not fled during the war, and granted them citizenship. Yet the Arab states allowed only token numbers to enter, appealing to the UN to support the remainder of the refugees through humanitarian aid. Thus the UNRWA was born. To this day, it is unique within the UN as a relief agency intended to serve only one class of people. The world's other refugees—all 21.8 million from countries ranging from the Balkans, West Africa, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and the Horn of Africa—are served by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Unlike UNHCR, though, which seeks to ensure that states fulfill their obligations to protect refugees and to facilitate their permanent settlement, UNRWA helps Palestinian refugees *as* refugees. It has therefore institutionalized the Palestinian refugee problem, evidenced by the fact that the number of refugees it serves has increased from 914,000 in 1950 to more than 3.8 million today. UNRWA camps have also become hotbeds of terrorism: Israel reports that over half of the half the suicide bombers who have carried out attacks over the past 19 months were residents of the UNRWA-run refugee camp in Jenin or terrorists who were trained there.

1974: The PLO is granted permanent observer status

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed by the Arab League in 1964 to centralize smaller resistance groups operating in Israel and in refugee camps elsewhere. Its official founding document, the Palestine National Charter, explicitly rejected the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (allowing for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine) and the UN Partition of 1947. It called for the destruction of the Jewish state and the subsequent liberation of all of historic Palestine, and it employed terrorist tactics to accomplish its goals. On November 13, 1974, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat spoke to the UN's General Assembly. Several months later, the Assembly took the unprecedented step of inviting the PLO, a non-member nation, to join UN discussions as a permanent observer.

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1975: 'Zionism Is Racism' (General Assembly Resolution 3379)

On November 10, 1975 the General Assembly passed resolution 3379 which "*Determines* that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." Zionism, the national aspiration of the Jewish people, manifests itself in the State of Israel. Carried to its logical conclusion, then, this resolution equates Israel's existence with racism. Yet this resolution ignores the fact that a large minority of Arabs live as citizens of Israel—far more than the number of Jews living in each of the Arab states. The resolution was repealed by the General Assembly in 1991, but the Arab block continues to try to revive it today.

1977: Division for Palestinian Rights

On December 2, 1977, the General Assembly approved the creation of the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, later renamed the Division for Palestinian Rights. The Division was created at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, itself established by the PLO. It publishes studies and reports and organizes an international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people. The Division for Palestinian Rights is part of the Secretariat, which ensures the everyday working of the United Nations and is staffed by international civil servants. Unlike the General Assembly, then, which is comprised of member nations each with their own political agendas, the Secretariat purports to be "exclusively international," not to be used to further the political objectives of any one nation.

1978: UNIFIL in Lebanon

In an act of self-defense, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin led IDF forces into Lebanon to halt PLO attacks on Israel. Opposed to the action, the UN ordered Israel out and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in. The "interim," however, has been 24 years and counting. The PLO quickly found a way to manipulate UNIFIL forces, and as a result soldiers routinely let PLO members pass through the security zone.

2000: Hezbullah Kidnapping

In October 2000, Hezbullah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers on the Lebanese border. Tapes were made of the crime, showing the kidnappers disguised as UNIFIL soldiers using real and forged UN paraphernalia from the international forces. Though UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan originally denied any knowledge of the tapes, hiding from Israel in fear of violating UN "objectivity," he later admitted his knowledge of them and released them to Israel under international pressure. Even in turning over the tapes, however, the UN insisted on blacking out the faces of the Hezbullah members, thereby thwarting Israel's attempt to track them down. The three Israeli soldiers have still not been found.

2002: The Jenin Probe

In April, immediately after Israel invaded the Jenin refugee camp to search for terrorists there, the Palestinian Authority claimed a massacre had taken place and that 500 people were killed. UN Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen joined the fray by announcing that Israel's actions were "horrifying beyond belief" and "morally repugnant." The UN sought to investigate these allegations and to determine whether a massacre had in fact taken place. Israel, fearing the investigation would be biased, agreed to it on the condition that at least one member of the commission have relevant military experience. The UN refused the condition and the probe was aborted. In August, however, the UN published a report based on the earlier findings of other humanitarian groups, which cleared Israel of all charges of a massacre. The report was ultimately equivocal about the nature of the Israeli response, but asserted without qualification that "Palestinian militants in the camp, as elsewhere, adopted methods which constitute breaches of international law that have been and continue to be condemned by the United Nations."

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guest comment

Surviving, A Testimony

Eliad Moreh

On Wednesday, July 31 2002, at 1:40 pm, my life was changed forever. I don't know how long the turmoil of the explosion lasted—whether it was a matter of seconds or entire minutes. All I know is that from the moment I realized I had survived a terrorist attack, I felt my life had changed. It was a feeling inside of me—probably a survival instinct—that gave me an inner force I had never before experienced. Suddenly, I considered life differently.

The facts are simple in their cruelty. I survived the terrorist bomb attack at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, while the friend sitting in front of me, David Diego Ladowski, was killed on the spot. I did not know this then. All I remember is that we were peacefully eating lunch, in the Frank Sinatra cafeteria. We had already finished our meal and Diego was telling me a story. He was to leave in nine days to assume the position of second secretary, deputy chief of mission at the Israeli Embassy in Peru. We had a lot to tell each other, like two friends who would not meet again for a long time. But suddenly, in the middle of what would be Diego's last story, the bomb exploded.

I couldn't tell what happened. I just remember that all was suddenly dark and I somehow found myself standing. I felt a bullet of fire in the back of my neck, and I understood that it was a terrorist attack. When I realized the tumult of the explosion was over and that people had started to run outside through the broken glass doors, I left the place myself.

Outside, as I felt the blood flowing down my neck, I perceived the world with an extreme intensity. The sky was never so bright, the sun never so dazzling. I could walk—my body was in one piece. And though I could not know whether my wounds were serious (the projectile that hit my neck had, miraculously, missed my spine), I cherished life more than ever. I was determined to survive at all costs.

At the same time, I felt a scream inside of me, a scream of rage and revolt. A scream for my suffering and for the suffering of all those bleeding around me. A rage at the fact that an incalculable number of terrorist attacks had occurred in Israel in the past two years, and that somehow we had become accustomed to this, as if one could become accustomed to such a dreadful situation. I felt that in a way, through our own passivity, we had become docile victims—too easy targets.

But most of all, I felt and still feel revolt. The revolt of someone wrongly attacked who escaped his aggressor. I was put to death and somehow survived my execution. But for what crime? What was the crime of those who, like my friend, did not survive their executions? What was the crime of the 86 people who, like me, were injured that day? And what was the crime of the 600 people who have died at the hands of terrorists in the past two years? What of the thousands of people wounded, and of the thousands of orphans, widows, and widowers who lost their dearest ones? What was their crime? To be a Jew? To live on the soil of Israel, to go to the university, to have lunch? To live, to speak, to breathe? Probably all of these answers are correct. Terrorism stems from blind and gratuitous hatred; it is the enemy of everything that is living and free.

Some people in Israel and abroad place terrorism in the context of the political conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. To place terrorism in any context is to avoid confronting its horror and inexcusable nature. What cause can justify the deliberate murder of as many human beings as possible? What kind of a people could officially appeal to terrorism as a legitimate weapon in their desire for statehood? And this is all the more repugnant given that the Palestinians were offered an independent state in the frame of the Oslo agreement.

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There is no explanation for terrorism. I tell you out of my crying body, out of my screaming heart and my wounded mind, I tell you that nothing, absolutely nothing justifies such pain. And no reason in the world can excuse the criminals who perpetrate such inhuman deeds. There are times in history when one has to condemn evil. The facts are so horrible that they do not leave a place for understanding, because to understand means to justify. And I have to warn you, trying to justify such barbarous acts makes you become morally complicit in them.

I ask not for revenge, only for justice. Vengeance will not reduce my torment. Nothing will ever be able to tame the pain, to bring back the lost ones, to restore the time of peace in my life. The damage is done forever. Yet since I have experienced suffering, I wish with all my being that no one will ever feel the kind of pain I feel, that no one will ever know what it's like to lose forever, in just a few seconds, a person he loves. I want for no one to have his nights troubled by nightmares and anguish of the kind I have.

I therefore think everything must be done to fight terrorism, because I do not want to see more people hurt by such affliction. This means we must use all forms of prevention. There should be no pity for the ones who are ready to perpetrate such deeds, because they deserve the severest punishment.

Because I have survived, and Diego has not, I feel it is my duty to speak out. We should not think of terrorism as a threat to Israel alone and interpret it as part of a confined political conflict. Terrorism represents a threat for the democratic world at large. Furthermore, the tragedy of September 11 should serve as a warning to all those who think terrorism and evil may be explained. It has shown to all of us that the West, with its cultural, scientific, and economic achievements—and most of all its freedom—has been chosen as a target. It is useless to ask for the reasons behind this religious war. Besides, this threat leaves no time for such considerations. Now is the time to resist and to fight—for our right to live as free men, each according to his own faith.

I choose to be on the side of life; it is a matter of decision. To fall down would be a victory for those who tried to defeat us. For me, the answer to terrorism is to value and strengthen life wherever it is. If I have learned anything from my experience and the loss of my friend, it is that the only thing that belongs to me—and to each of us—is the good we have done in this world. What we have given in a lifetime is ours forever. And no murderer, even of the vilest kind, can destroy this.

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correction

Editor's Note: Due to an error, the final section of Professor Asher Biemann's article, "Three Reflections on Zionism" was cut short in Harvard Israel Review's first issue. That section is printed here.

The matter for each camp of Zionism was sufficiently clear: Just as an increasing multiplicity of Jewish religious branches was engaged in a battle over "true" Judaism, the new variety of Zionists vied for "true" Zionism. "True *Yehudim*," Jacob Rosenheim wrote on behalf of Jewish Orthodoxy in 1906, using the "authentic" Hebrew word for "Jews," "were Zionists long before Zionism even came into being." In the rhetoric of truth and illusion, authenticity and fictitiousness, the forms of practical-territorial Zionism emerged as the ultimate illusion. Biting criticism descended upon Herzl's literary escapade of 1902, *Old-New-Land*. The Orthodox journal *Der Israelit* treated it as a mere "product of fantasy" which, better yet, the author Herzl had begun to take for reality.[47] No less biting was Achad Haam's review of Herzl's futuristic novel, noting that "in *Old-New-Land* nothing can surprise us, for everything is one big miracle."[48] The minute imagination of facts, Achad Haam continued, illustrates how the "'messianic age' that is at our door reflects itself in the head of the Zionist leader."[49] For Rosenheim, the hallucination of facticity was the essential symptom of "Zionist hypnosis."[50] In contrast to political fairy-tales, the "renaissance of traditional Jewish spirit and its outward forms is possible at all times," Rosenheim insisted, adding Herzl's own, now proverbial words: "If you wish it, it is not a dream."[51] According to Breuer, the great illusion of all Zionists was their conviction that they were agents in the "actual" world and "real" history, in the realm of Kant's "*an-sich*," while in truth, they were mere shadows in the phenomenal world. "Torah true" Zionism, on the other hand, and spiritual-cultural Zionism, both of which considered themselves nothing less than identical with "true Judaism," could claim "truth," for they had not attached themselves to the factual world, to material topos. Rather, the physical space, to them, was a place that was both there and not there, a place yet to be realized as a space of Torah, "spirit," or "culture." In practice, the utopian sphere, the "meta-historical" truth, was the only topos these Zionists could hope to lay claim on. Quite naturally, their parallel conquest of utopia set religious and spiritual/cultural Zionists apart with mutual hostility much fiercer than any political Zionist could have provoked.

The critics of Old-New-Land were right. The novel was not much more than a low-brow combination of fin-de-siècle science-fiction, social experimentalism, and literary *schmaltz*. But what they failed to see was that Herzl had conceived of it as exactly that; that not Herzl but his critics had fallen prey to the illusion of words, and that Herzl, in fact, was well aware that his Zionism had to appear to the world as a piece of art for it to be effective: "Artists will understand," Herzl noted in his diary as early as June 1895, "why I who otherwise am known to be a man of reason, had to let grow hyperboles and dreams in between my practical, political, and legal explanations like green grass in between grey cobble-stones . . . This delusion [Rausch] was necessary."[52] From his early diaries we know that the idea of a novel preceded Herzl's plan to write a practical pamphlet. "In order to allure Jews to the land, you have to tell them the legend of gold," Herzl quoted himself responding to the Baron de Hirsch. "The fantasy could be: Who plows, sows, and harvests will find gold in the sheaf."[53] "Believe me," Herzl wrote in a letter to the same Baron, "you can only make politics with an entire people—even more so if it lives in dispersion—with ideas that are high up in the air," with "dreams, songs, and fantasies," in a word—"with religion."[54] The "mighty legend," therefore, was the single argument for a settlement in Palestine. A writer by profession, Herzl was convinced from the start that the medium of legends and fantasies would be esthetics and "powerful propaganda." "Send magnificent posters to the [world] exhibit of 1900," he noted in his diary five years in advance.[55] "Artistic folk festivals" all over the country with "colorful parades" would do their part in maintaining the legend.[56] "In truth, I still am a great dramatist," Herzl wrote a few days later. "I take poor, ragged people from the streets, put them in elaborate garments, and let them act in a fantastic play that I have devised."[57]

This should suffice to show that the Herzl we encounter in his diaries appeared as a political magician rather than a hallucinating playwright. In fact, where Herzl loosened the utopian cloak of his pragmatic realism—as in the Uganda proposal—reality collapsed. To Herzl, Zionism was one grand stage, the total set of a play. What made Herzl's plan as successful as it was (and its success was limited already at the time), was precisely the illusion of the "Promised Land" fused with the "illusion of the old home." The Jews of Europe would "hardly notice" that they were being moved to a new land.[58] "Entire milieus, where Jews feel at home, must be transplanted," Herzl suggested.[59] And to the potential new immigrant who could not live without Viennese pastries he responded: "Then I shall also transplant an authentic Viennese Café."[60]

And here we can revisit the fundamental difference between topian and utopian Zionism. While Herzl had to dress his utter realism in utopianism, the religious Zionists and their spiritual/cultural antipodes had to dress their utopianism in realism. It was not enough for the Zionism of the "true" Zionists to be more true. It also had to be more real. Hence, Buber distinguished between the Zionism of realpolitik, whose politicians were "fictitious," and the "Zionism of reality" (*Wirklichkeitszionismus*), whose agents acted in the domain of "realization"; between "actualism" and "true" realism. "Actualism" he called the simple "mastering of the facts,"[61] "realization" "the secret of the covenant between God and man."[62] Once again, the "true" reality was not the physical reality of the land but a meta-topian, meta-historical reality transforming the people. To become real, the "true" Zionists had to become utopian. And to become utopian, they had to become real. If the agenda of the "true" Zionists ultimately remained unfulfilled, then it was not because the Zionism of realpolitik had outlived them on the stage of real-history but because Zionism, to them, had not yet become reality. Like the true messianists, the "true" Zionists continued to live in the pre-Zionist era, always "in awe before reality,"[63] always realizing without ever actualizing.

The tension between topos and utopia was never resolved in the history of Zionism. Nor did any of the competing tendencies in Zionism ever emerge as ultimately successful. Nor, for that matter, did any of them completely fail. In a certain sense, Israel "fell into place" with all the tragedies and triumphs that accompany the struggle for the bare survival of a nation. It did so not out of historical necessity but out of human need. And when it did, it fell from the abundant realm of time into the narrow realm of space. This was perhaps the most dramatic transformation of Judaism in the modern period: The Judaism of time has become a Judaism of space. It can no longer deny the power of topos, for it can no longer rely on the power of time. Time is a venture without refuge. In time we could call ourselves the masters of utopia, but not more than that. In space we are the agents of actuality, but we are also limits to others. Where I am, says the voice of topos, there you are not. And the voice of utopia, what does it say? It remains silent in the limitlessness of time.

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